SecurityIdentity security

SonicWall's SSL VPN bug lets a valid password skip SAML and your MFA

An exploited SonicOS flaw lets someone with a password for another login method skip SAML and the MFA behind it. Which builds fix it, the NSv catch, and how to spot logins your identity provider never saw.

Cohash Security Practice November 2026 15 min read 7 chapters 3-question check
part 34 of 34 · Platform releases, explained from scratch
01 VPN loginpage 02 Alternatepassword 03 SAMLskipped 04 No MFAprompt 05 Inside thenetwork

the ideaA password for another login skips SAML. MFA never asks.

after reading, you can
  • Pick the right SonicOS build for every Gen7, Gen8 and NSv firewall you run
  • Spot VPN logins that never went through your identity provider
  • Remove the local and directory accounts that give SAML a side door

SonicWall firewalls that send VPN logins through SAMLdefinitionThe standard that lets the firewall hand a login to an identity provider like Entra ID. The provider checks the user, usually with MFA, then vouches for them. can be talked past. Someone with a working password for another sign-in method can skip the SAML step, and the MFA your identity provider enforces never gets asked. SonicWall says it has a report of exploitation, CISA added the flaw to its exploited list on November 6, and the fixed builds are out. Upgrade before November 20.

in plain wordsHigh, exploited, on CISA KEV

Your VPN sends people through single sign-on and MFA. Someone with the right password can still go around it.

Many companies set up their SonicWall VPN so staff sign in through Microsoft Entra ID, Google Workspace or another identity provider. That's SAML, and it's usually where MFA lives. CVE-2026-19868 lets a person who holds valid credentials for a different login method on the firewall get a VPN session without going through SAML at all. The identity provider never sees the login, so its MFA prompt never fires. SonicWall's advisory says the flaw only matters when SAML is switched on for SSL VPN logins.

think of it like this

Think of an office where everyone is supposed to badge in at the front desk, where a guard checks ID. There's also an old side door that still opens with a key. Anyone holding one of those keys walks in without meeting the guard, and the visitor log at the front desk never shows them.

who should care
  • Anyone with a SonicWall Gen7 or Gen8 firewall
  • Teams using SAML for SSL VPN logins
  • MSPs managing SonicWall for clients
  • Identity teams who own the VPN's SSO app
chapter 01

Why it matters to you

A VPN login is a way into your network. If the MFA in front of it can be skipped, a password stolen in a phishing email or reused from an old breach is enough to get inside. From there, whoever holds the session can reach whatever that user's VPN access allows.

Nov 20CISA's due date for US federal agencies to fix CVE-2026-19868
7SonicOS CVEs fixed together in advisory SNWLID-2026-0014
7.1 / 7.5SonicWall's score, then the score CISA's analysts gave it
NoneWorkaround listed by SonicWall. The fix is the upgrade

How likely is it? SonicWall's PSIRT says it investigated a report of potential exploitation and urges customers to upgrade as soon as possible. Canada's Cyber Centre puts it more bluntly: SonicWall indicates the flaw is being exploited. CISA's catalog marks ransomware use as unknown for now.

The two severity scores tell you something too. SonicWall rates it 7.1 and assumes the attacker already has low-level privileges. CISA's analysts scored it 7.5 with no privileges required. Our reading is that, from the firewall's side, a valid password for another method is all it takes. Either way, it needs a working credential. That's why it sits at high rather than critical, and why it's still dangerous: working credentials are exactly what attackers collect.

SonicWall's SSL VPN has a history here. CISA's list already holds earlier SonicOS flaws, among them CVE-2024-40766 and the SSL VPN authentication bypass CVE-2024-53704, both now marked as used in ransomware campaigns. If your firewall was slow to get those fixes, treat this one as a test of whether that's changed.

how the attack worksHow a password gets past SAML and MFASonicWall hasn't published technical details of the flaw. We drew this from the wording in its advisory and CISA's catalog entry, so the middle steps describe what happens, not how the code fails.
  1. 01 SAML is on for SSL VPN

    The firewall is set to send VPN users to an identity provider, which asks for MFA before it vouches for them.

  2. 02 Someone holds another credential

    Someone already has a password that works for another login method on the firewall, say a local account or a directory account.

  3. 03 They sign in the other way

    They present that credential to the SSL VPN service instead of going through the SAML redirect.

  4. 04 SAML isn't enforced

    On affected builds the firewall accepts the login without insisting on SAML. The identity provider never hears about it.

  5. 05 A tunnel opens inside

    They get a VPN session with that user's access, and no MFA prompt ever appeared.

CISA files it as CWE-308, use of single-factor authentication. SonicWall hasn't said which alternate methods count. The firewall can still check local users and directory accounts itself, so look at those first. SonicWall's SAML guide names SSLVPN ServicesdefinitionThe default SSL VPN group on a SonicWall. SonicWall's SAML guide says users must be in it to connect. Other groups can be given VPN access to specific networks. as the default VPN group. Its members are who can connect, so start there, then check what each group's VPN access lets it reach.

chapter 02

What SonicWall fixed, and in which builds

What the update fixes, the exploited bug first

fixedCVE-2026-19868: SAML and MFA bypass on SSL VPN

A user with valid credentials for an alternate method can skip SAML and SAML-enforced MFA. Exploited. Only matters when SAML is on for SSL VPN logins. SonicWall rates it 7.1.

fixedCVE-2026-82308: SSL VPN crash before login

A heap overflow in the SSL VPN service that a remote attacker with no login can use to knock the service over. Rated 7.5. It applies whether or not you use SAML.

fixedCVE-2026-107155 and 107154: management interface

Two holes in the management interface: a loose cross-domain policy, and a session check that trusts the IP address. Each is rated 8.8, and someone has to be tricked into an action first.

fixedCVE-2026-77708 and 77709: TACACS+ client

Two buffer overflows in the TACACS+ authentication client that can cause a denial of service before login. Rated 5.9.

fixedCVE-2026-19703: weak password hashing on NSv

On virtual appliances, someone who already has local admin-level access could pull out a platform credential. Rated 5.2, so it sits low on the list.

tableFind your firewall, then install the build in the right-hand column. Model lists come from SonicWall's advisory
Your firewallModelsAffected buildsInstall this
Gen7 hardwareTZ 270 to TZ 670, NSa 2700 to 6700, NSsp 10700 to 157007.3.3-7015 and older7.3.4-7013 or later. 7.3.4-7015 is the newer build
Gen7 NSv (virtual)NSv 270, 470, 870 on ESX, KVM, Hyper-V, AWS, Azure7.3.3-7015 and older7.3.4-7015. 7.3.4-7013 wasn't released for NSv
Gen8 hardwareTZ 80 to TZ 680, NSa 2800 to 58008.2.2-8015 and older8.2.3-8015 or later
Gen8 NSv (virtual)NSv XS, S, M, L8.2.2-8015 and older8.2.3-8015 or later
Gen6Not listed in the advisoryNot statedAsk SonicWall. Gen6 NSv support ended April 16, 2026

From earlier SSL VPN flaws to this week's deadline

  1. Sep 9, 2024
    CVE-2024-40766 (SonicOS) added to CISA's list

    Now marked as used in ransomware campaigns.

  2. Feb 18, 2025
    SSL VPN auth bypass CVE-2024-53704 added

    Also marked as used in ransomware campaigns.

  3. Apr 16, 2026
    Gen6 NSv virtual firewalls reach end of support
  4. Oct 2026
    SonicOS 7.3.4-7013 for TZ, NSa and NSsp

    SonicWall's notes for this build say NSv would have to wait for a later release.

  5. Nov 6, 2026
    Advisory, CVE record and CISA KEV entry

    SonicWall puts out its advisory covering seven CVEs. CISA lists the SAML bypass as exploited that same day.

  6. Nov 2026
    7.3.4-7015 (with NSv) and 8.2.3-8015

    Look in the resolved issues of either set of notes and you'll find the SSL VPN authentication fix.

  7. Nov 20, 2026
    Federal due date under BOD 26-04

The table has a trap for virtual firewalls. The advisory names 7.3.4-7013 as the first fixed Gen7 build, but SonicWall's release notes for 7.3.4-7013 say the NSvdefinitionSonicWall's virtual firewall, run on VMware, KVM, Hyper-V or in AWS and Azure. It sometimes gets builds later than the hardware. version wasn't released at that point. NSv 270, 470 and 870 get the fix in 7.3.4-7015. If someone ticked off your virtual firewalls because "7.3.4-7013 is out", check them again.

Watch for a second mismatch if you work from a feed. Canada's Cyber Centre bulletin describes the affected range as "prior to 8.2.2-8015" for Gen8, while SonicWall's advisory and the CVE record say 8.2.2-8015 itself is affected and the fix is 8.2.3-8015. Go by SonicWall's page. A firewall on 8.2.2-8015 still needs the upgrade.

side by sideSAML on or off for SSL VPN changes how urgent this is. It doesn't change whether you upgrade
SAML is on for SSL VPN
  • Exposed to the exploited MFA bypass right now
  • Upgrade today, or turn SSL VPN off until you can
  • Check firewall logins against the identity provider's sign-in log
  • Clear out spare local accounts and anyone who shouldn't be in SSLVPN Services
SAML is off for SSL VPN
  • Not affected by CVE-2026-19868, per SonicWall
  • Still exposed to the pre-login SSL VPN crash, CVE-2026-82308
  • Still has the management interface flaws
  • Upgrade on your normal emergency-patch timeline
chapter 03

What to do now

What to do now, by who you are

Business ownertoday
  • Ask IT or your managed provider, in writing, whether you have SonicWall firewalls and which SonicOS build each runs.
  • Ask whether VPN logins go through SAML single sign-on. If yes, this one is urgent.
  • Agree a short VPN outage tonight or this weekend for the upgrade. There's no workaround.
  • If anyone in your company uses VPN without MFA as a matter of course, ask why.
Firewall and network adminstoday
  • Upgrade Gen7 to 7.3.4-7013 or later (NSv to 7.3.4-7015) and Gen8 to 8.2.3-8015 or later.
  • Export the config first. 7.3.4 can't be rolled back to an older build.
  • If you can't upgrade today and SAML is on, turn off SSL VPN or limit it to known source addresses until you can.
  • Keep the management interface off the internet. Two of the other CVEs sit there.
Identity teamthis week
  • List every local user on the firewall with VPN rights. Remove them or reset their passwords.
  • Check who's in the SSLVPN Services group and take out anyone who shouldn't be.
  • Find directory accounts the firewall can check over LDAP or RADIUS and make sure they aren't a second way in.
  • Make sure the SAML app in your identity provider requires MFA for every VPN user.
Security teamthis week
  • Turn on event 1080, Successful SSLVPN User Login, and send it to Log Monitor and your SIEM.
  • Match each VPN login on the firewall against a sign-in for the VPN's SAML app at your identity provider.
  • Chase any VPN login with no matching identity provider sign-in. That's the pattern we'd expect this flaw to leave.
  • Look at SSL VPN, Status for who's connected right now, with each user name, client WAN IP and login time.

The most useful check takes a few minutes and needs no special tools. When SAML works as designed, every VPN session starts with a sign-in at your identity provider. A session that shows up on the firewall with no matching sign-in at the provider either came in another way or points to a gap in your logs. Both are worth knowing about.

SonicWall's own guide shows where to find the firewall side. Under Device, Log, Settings, open the Users category and Group Authentication Access, then set event 1080 to display in Log Monitor. Event 263 records user logouts. Do it now, even before you upgrade, so the next login gets logged.

An upgrade order for this weekend

  1. 01
    Find every firewall

    Include branch TZ boxes, the DR pair, lab units and NSv instances in AWS or Azure. Write down the model, the generation and the SonicOS build for each.

  2. 02
    Mark the ones using SAML for SSL VPN

    Open Network, SSL VPN, Server Settings on each box. Where the authentication type says SAML, that firewall goes first.

  3. 03
    Save the configuration

    Export the settings and keep a copy off the box. You can't downgrade from 7.3.4 if something goes wrong.

  4. 04
    Upgrade

    Gen7 hardware to 7.3.4-7013 or later, Gen7 NSv to 7.3.4-7015, Gen8 to 8.2.3-8015 or later.

  5. 05
    Check the result

    Confirm the new build on the dashboard, test a VPN login through SAML, and confirm the identity provider shows the sign-in and the MFA prompt.

  6. 06
    Clean up the accounts

    Remove spare local users with VPN rights, trim the SSLVPN Services group, and reset passwords for anything you keep.

chapter 04

Harden so the next one hurts less

The upgrade closes this hole. The weakness underneath is older: firewalls collect side doors over the years. A local admin account from the install, a test user nobody removed, an LDAP fallback someone added during an outage. Each one is a login that doesn't go through your identity provider. Close those and the next authentication bug has less to work with.

before

Before: SAML in front, other logins still open behind it

SSL VPN is set to SAML, but local users and directory accounts can still be checked by the firewall directly. Logins live only on the firewall, so nobody compares them with the identity provider's records.

Before: SAML in front, other logins still open behind it SSL VPN is set to SAML, but local users and directory accounts can still be checked by the firewall directly. Logins live only on the firewall, so nobody compares them with the identity provider's records. 01 · INTERNET 02 · EDGE 03 · IDENTITY 04 · INSIDE SAML login redirect other method direct check tunnel Staff with MFA SAML route Stolen password alternate method SonicWall 7.3.3 SSL VPN, SAML on Identity provider MFA here Local users and LDAP no MFA Office network © Cohash · cohash.com
01 · INTERNET02 · EDGE03 · IDENTITY04 · INSIDE Staff with MFA: SAML route Staff with MFA SAML route Stolen password: alternate method Stolen password alternate method SonicWall 7.3.3: SSL VPN, SAML on SonicWall 7.3.3 SSL VPN, SAML on Identity provider: MFA here Identityprovider MFA here Local users and LDAP: no MFA Local users andLDAP no MFA Office network Office network SAML login redirect other method direct check tunnel © Cohash · cohash.com
after

After: one way in, and someone watching it

The firewall runs a fixed build, spare local accounts are gone, and every VPN login is logged and matched against the identity provider. A login with no matching sign-in raises an alert.

After: one way in, and someone watching it The firewall runs a fixed build, spare local accounts are gone, and every VPN login is logged and matched against the identity provider. A login with no matching sign-in raises an alert. 01 · INTERNET 02 · EDGE 03 · IDENTITY 04 · INSIDE SAML login redirect blocked login events sign-in log tunnel Staff with MFA SAML route Stolen password refused SonicWall 7.3.4 SAML enforced Identity provider MFA for every user SIEM event 1080 matched Office network segmented by group © Cohash · cohash.com
01 · INTERNET02 · EDGE03 · IDENTITY04 · INSIDE Staff with MFA: SAML route Staff with MFA SAML route Stolen password: refused Stolen password refused SonicWall 7.3.4: SAML enforced SonicWall 7.3.4 SAML enforced Identity provider: MFA for every user Identityprovider MFA for every user SIEM: event 1080 matched SIEM event 1080 matched Office network: segmented by group Office network segmented by group SAML login redirect blocked login events tunnel © Cohash · cohash.com

Durable fixes, tied to this case

  1. 01
    Keep one break-glass account, and only one

    You'll want a local admin for when the identity provider is down. Give it a long random password kept in a vault, keep it out of the SSLVPN Services group, and alert on every use.

  2. 02
    Treat the VPN group as privileged

    Membership of SSLVPN Services decides who can open a tunnel, and group VPN access settings decide what they can reach. Review it like you'd review a domain admin group, and feed it from your identity provider's groups where you can.

  3. 03
    Log logins somewhere the firewall can't edit

    Send event 1080 and 263 to a SIEM or syslog server. Logs that stay on the box are the first thing lost when it's rebuilt.

  4. 04
    Reconcile firewall and identity provider logins

    Make the check from section 3 a standing rule in the SIEM. It'll catch this flaw and any later bug that lets logins skip SAML.

  5. 05
    Limit what a VPN session can reach

    Use groups and access rules so a VPN user lands only on the systems their job needs. A bypassed login then gets a narrow view.

  6. 06
    Plan the hardware cycle

    Gen6 isn't in this advisory, and Gen6 NSv support has already ended. If you still run Gen6, budget the move before the next SSL VPN advisory.

chapter 05

If you've been breached

When the firewall shows a login nobody at the identity provider saw

Write down what you see before you change anything. The firewall's session list and logs are your best evidence, and an upgrade or reboot can clear what's held on the box.

  1. 01Containfirst hour
    • Note down every active session on SSL VPN, Status, with the user name, client WAN IP and login time. You'll want it later.
    • Disable the accounts involved, on the firewall and in the directory.
    • Turn off SSL VPN, or limit it to known addresses, until the firewall is upgraded.
    • Export the firewall's logs and configuration and store them off the box.
  2. 02Investigatefirst two days
    • Match firewall logins against identity provider sign-ins as far back as your logs go.
    • For each unmatched session, trace the client virtual IP through internal firewall and server logs.
    • Check what the account touched: file shares, remote desktop, admin consoles, email.
    • Look for new local users, changed VPN group membership or edited access rules on the firewall.
  3. 03Removefirst three days
    • Reset passwords for every account that logged in through the bypass, and for all local firewall users.
    • Take out anything the intruder added, whether that's an account, a rule or a changed setting.
    • Rotate secrets the session could reach, such as service account passwords on servers it touched.
  4. 04Recoverfirst week
    • Upgrade to the fixed build and confirm VPN logins go through SAML and MFA again.
    • Turn SSL VPN back on with the trimmed VPN group and logging to the SIEM.
    • Keep watching unmatched logins closely for the next few weeks.
  5. 05Report and learnas required
    • Tell your cyber insurer early. Most policies set notice deadlines, and missing one can cost you cover.
    • Check breach notice duties with counsel if personal or regulated data was reachable. Those clocks often start when you find out.
    • Federal agencies have BOD 26-04 and CISA's reporting rules to follow. Others can use those steps as a checklist.
    • Work out how the side-door account came to exist, then close that route so it doesn't come back.
chapter 06

What this could look like: three typical setups

What this could look like: three typical setups

01 Old localaccount 02 TZ 470 on7.3.2 03 SAML skipped 04 Officenetwork
scenario 01High risk
A small firm whose MSP set up SAML and kept the install account
the setup
An accounting firm has a TZ 470 on 7.3.2. Its MSP moved VPN logins to Entra ID with MFA last year but left the local account it used at install, still in the SSLVPN Services group.
what happens
Anyone holding that account's password, from a reused password or an old leak, can open a tunnel without MFA. Entra ID shows nothing.
what to do
Upgrade to 7.3.4 tonight. Remove the install account from the VPN group or delete it, and ask the MSP for every firewall login since the move to SAML.
01 TZ on 7.3.4 fixed 02 NSv on 7.3.3 still open 03 Azure workloads
scenario 02High risk
A company whose virtual firewalls missed the first fixed build
the setup
A mid-size company runs NSv 470 in Azure and TZ boxes in branches. IT upgraded the TZ units to 7.3.4-7013 in October and noted NSv as done too, but no NSv build was available then.
what happens
The cloud firewalls are still on 7.3.3 with SAML on for remote staff, so the exposed boxes are the ones everyone thought were finished.
what to do
Upgrade the NSv instances to 7.3.4-7015, then check every firewall's actual build on its dashboard instead of the change ticket.
01 Feed range 02 8.2.2-8015 marked clean 03 Upgrade to 8.2.3
scenario 03Medium risk
An enterprise that trusted a feed's version range
the setup
An enterprise with Gen8 NSa 4800s on 8.2.2-8015 builds its patch list from a feed that says "prior to 8.2.2-8015". Its firewalls show as clean.
what happens
8.2.2-8015 is affected according to SonicWall, so every Gen8 firewall is still exposed while the report shows green.
what to do
Use SonicWall's advisory as the reference, upgrade to 8.2.3-8015, and fix the rule in the vulnerability tool so it matches the vendor's range.

We made all three up. None is a real incident or a Cohash client, though the versions and behaviour match what SonicWall, CISA and Canada's Cyber Centre have published.

chapter 07

How Cohash helps

We don't sell or run SonicWall, and the firewall upgrade stays with whoever manages it. Our work starts at the identity provider. Our identity and access management team tightens the VPN's SAML app in Microsoft Entra ID and tracks down accounts that still log in around it. When the cleanup needs more hands, our Entra ID engineers can join for a few weeks. If you're not sure where your side doors are, the free assessment is the place to start.

key takeaways

What to take from this

  1. 01

    If SSL VPN uses SAML on a Gen7 or Gen8 SonicWall, upgrade today: 7.3.4-7013 or later, NSv 7.3.4-7015, Gen8 8.2.3-8015.

  2. 02

    There's no workaround. If you can't upgrade yet, turn SSL VPN off or limit it to known addresses.

  3. 03

    8.2.2-8015 is affected even though one government feed suggests otherwise. Go by SonicWall's advisory.

  4. 04

    Match firewall VPN logins against identity provider sign-ins. A login with no matching sign-in is the warning sign.

  5. 05

    Remove spare local accounts and trim the SSLVPN Services group, so the next bypass has no side door to use.

platforms in this noteMicrosoft Entra ID →
fact-checked November 2026 against vendor and official documentation · where to go next
  1. How Cohash delivers Microsoft Entra ID: scope, roles and architecture
  2. Hire vetted Microsoft Entra ID engineers
  3. Identity & Access Management
  4. Book a 30-minute working session with a senior engineer
01Is my SonicWall affected if we use SAML for the VPN?

Check two things. First the build: Gen7 on 7.3.3-7015 or older, or Gen8 on 8.2.2-8015 or older, is affected. Then the setting: SonicWall says the flaw only matters if SAML is enabled for SSL VPN logins, under Network, SSL VPN, Server Settings. If both are true, upgrade today.

02Which SonicOS version fixes the SAML MFA bypass?

Gen7 hardware: 7.3.4-7013 or later. Gen7 NSv virtual firewalls: 7.3.4-7015, because 7.3.4-7013 wasn't released for NSv. Gen8 hardware and NSv: 8.2.3-8015 or later.

03Is there a workaround if I can't upgrade yet?

SonicWall lists none. If SAML is on for SSL VPN and you can't upgrade straight away, the safe interim step is turning SSL VPN off or limiting it to known source addresses. Removing spare local VPN accounts reduces the risk but doesn't fix the flaw.

04We don't use SAML for the VPN. Do we still need to upgrade?

Yes. CVE-2026-19868 doesn't touch you, but the same update fixes six other CVEs. One of them crashes the SSL VPN service before anyone logs in, and two sit in the management interface at 8.8.

05Is CVE-2026-19868 being exploited?

Treat it as live. SonicWall says it looked into a report of potential exploitation, and Canada's Cyber Centre says SonicWall indicates it's being exploited. CISA put it on its exploited list on November 6, with a federal due date of November 20.

06Does the attacker need a password?

Yes. The flaw needs valid credentials for another login method the firewall accepts. SonicWall hasn't said which ones, but local users and directory accounts are the likely candidates. SonicWall rates it 7.1, high rather than critical, and spare local accounts with VPN rights are the first thing to clean up.

07Are Gen6 SonicWall firewalls affected?

The advisory lists only Gen7 and Gen8 platforms and doesn't mention Gen6. Gen6 NSv virtual firewalls reached end of support on April 16, 2026, so don't count on fixes for them. Ask SonicWall about Gen6 hardware you still run.

next track

That's the end of this track.

Next up: running enterprise platforms well. ERP, CRM and ITSM work that holds up after go-live.

  1. 01HashiCorp Vault 2.2 explained: TPM login, post-quantum PKI and the October fixes
  2. 02Upgrading to SailPoint IdentityIQ 9.0: what breaks and what to fix first
  3. 03Terraform 1.17 explained: what's new, who it touches and how we'd upgrade
  4. 04BeyondTrust Remote Support zero-day: patch it, then check who got in
  5. 05Patch PHP and Node.js this week: what broke and who's exposed
  6. 06OpenShift support dates through 2027: which clusters run out first and how to plan the upgrades
  7. 07Oracle's October security patches: what to fix first in EBS, PeopleSoft and Access Manager
  8. 08Oracle Java drops four root certificates over eMudhra: patch, then test what breaks
  9. 09Delinea Secret Server auth bypass: why the FIDO2 hotfix isn't enough
  10. 10IBM Verify Access flaws let attackers run code without a login: patch to 11.0.3.2
  11. 11Foundry Workflows retire on December 1. We'd start moving yours to Agent Framework now
  12. 12Vertex AI is retiring text-embedding-005 and three other embedding models: how to re-embed before search breaks
  13. 13dbt drops v1.3 to v1.7 from its platform on January 31, 2027: get pinned jobs onto a release track before they're deleted
  14. 14Brotli CVE-2026-111497 is now on CISA's exploited list, and you probably run more copies than you think
  15. 15Auth0 moved the Rules and Hooks deadline: Hooks stop on 30 April 2027, Rules on 31 January 2028
  16. 16Still on Okta Classic Engine? Three features stop working on March 5, 2027, and two of them block the upgrade
  17. 17Patched GitLab, still exposed: the CI regex bug CISA lists as exploited, and the Ruby step people miss
  18. 18Patched Ivanti Connect Secure in October? Two more exploited bugs, and the AD cleanup
  19. 19Patch roundup, week of Oct 26: upgrade Secret Server today, then work down the list
  20. 20UiPath 2023.10 support has run out and 2024.10 is next. What we'd upgrade first
  21. 21Password Safe 24.3 runs out of support in December, and 26.3 is still one upgrade away
  22. 22Upgrade Entra Connect Sync before April 2027 and move users off Microsoft's SMS codes
  23. 23Chrome drops XSLT on 17 November. What breaks in InterSystems, and the fix for your version
  24. 24Agent Builder, Evals and saved prompts shut on 30 November. Here's what to pull out first
  25. 25BeyondTrust Remote Support and PRA 24.3 lose support in November, and there's no one-step upgrade
  26. 26OpenShift 4.19 is running out of support. Do you park on 4.22 or keep going to 5.0?
  27. 27Terraform Enterprise 2.1 moves VCS ingress into your agents. What to change before October 2027
  28. 28Mule 4.12 Edge leaves standard support this month. Upgrade to 4.13 before CloudHub does it for you
  29. 29RSA SecurID primary support ends in stages from December. Here's how you get to 8.9
  30. 30Delinea Secret Server login bypass: why 12.2.7 won't save you from this 9.9
  31. 31Entra password reset won't take directory phone numbers from February 2027. Who gets stuck?
  32. 32Linux kernel CVE-2026-98432: why switching off MPTCP won't save you, and what to patch
  33. 33Patch roundup, week of Nov 2: fix Linux and WS_FTP first, then work down the list
  34. 34SonicWall's SSL VPN bug lets a valid password skip SAML and your MFA
all learning tracks →
Time to upgrade or move No newenvironments Suspended Decommission… Nov 2026 Oct 2027
Engineering · 15 minDataverse for Teams is going away: what to keep, move or let go before September 2027

Most teams still have time to upgrade or move their apps. After September they don't.

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