IBM Verify Access flaws let attackers run code without a login: patch to 11.0.3.2
IBM fixed 22 flaws in Verify Identity Access and Security Verify Access, two of them unauthenticated code execution rated 9.8. Here's which versions really fix them, the patch order that keeps sign-in up, and what to check afterwards.
part 8 of 8 · Platform releases, explained from scratchthe ideaPatch to 11.0.3.2 or 10.0.9.4, then read the logs.
after reading, you can- Tell which Verify Access builds actually fix the flaws, and why some trackers still name the wrong one
- Patch appliances and containers one node at a time, so people can still sign in
- If you suspect a break-in, rebuild first and rotate bind passwords and signing keys after.
IBM has fixed 22 security flaws in Verify Identity Access and the older Security Verify Access, and two of them let someone on the network run their own code on the appliance without logging in. If you run either product, move to 11.0.3.2 or 10.0.9.4 this week. IBM lists no workaround, so the fix packdefinitionIBM's name for a cumulative update. 11.0.3-ISS-IVIA-FP0002 is the one that takes Verify Identity Access to 11.0.3.2. is the only real answer.
Someone could take over the box that signs people into your web apps. They wouldn't need a password.
Lots of companies run IBM Verify Access in front of their web apps. Everyone signs in through it, does their second factor there, and only then reaches the app. Two of the new flaws let an attacker who can reach the gateway send it data it unpacks without checking, and that data can make it run their commands. Whoever controls the gateway decides who gets into everything behind it. Nobody has reported an attack yet, and IBM's fix is out.
Picture the front desk of an office building, where every visitor signs in and gets a pass. Couriers leave parcels there, and the receptionist opens each one and does whatever the note inside says, without asking who sent it. Someone could post a note telling the desk to print them a pass. The fix pack makes the desk throw out parcels it can't vouch for.
- Teams running Verify Identity Access 11.0.x
- Teams still on Security Verify Access 10.0.x
- Anyone running it in Kubernetes or OpenShift
- Owners whose sign-in portal is run by IBM Verify
- Security and identity operations
Why it matters to you
An access gateway is a valuable box to break into. It sees every login, holds the keys it uses to sign tokens, and passes users through to applications that trust whatever it says about them. Someone running code on it can watch credentials go past, mint sessions for anyone, or change the rules about who gets in.
Both flaws score 9.8 because the attacker needs no account, no special conditions and nobody to click anything. CISA's own assessment in the CVE records rates exploitation as none so far, but marks the attack as automatable and the impact as total. That combination is the reason to act now and not wait for a public exploit. Wait for one and you'll be patching under pressure, at the same time as everyone else.
The other 20 fixes matter too. Two more, CVE-2026-19491 and CVE-2026-16823, let an attacker with no login bypass authentication or security restrictions, on a gateway whose whole job is checking who gets in. Another lets them write files through path traversal. If your gateway sits on the internet, treat this as an emergency change and skip the next maintenance window.
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01 A crafted request
Anyone who can reach the gateway sends it a request. There's no login to get through first, and nobody inside has to click a thing.
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02 The product unpacks it
The gateway turns that data back into live objects and never checks whether it should trust what's inside.
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03 Hidden instructions run
The data is built so that unpacking it starts code the attacker picked. Nothing has to be logged in for that to happen.
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04 The gateway is theirs
With code running on the box, they can read logins, change policy or reach the apps behind it.
For engineers: the weakness class is CWE-502, deserializationdefinitionWhat a program does when it turns data from outside back into live objects. Skip the checks and crafted input can make the program run someone else's code. of untrusted data. MITRE's description is short. The product deserializes untrusted data without making sure the result will be valid. OWASP's cheat sheet explains why that ends in remote code execution so often. Native serialization formats let the incoming bytes decide which object types get built, and some of those types do real work while they're being built.
IBM's bulletin gives the class and the score and nothing else. It doesn't say which port, endpoint or component is affected, and it doesn't say whether the reverse proxy, the runtime or the management interface is the way in. Plan as if the internet-facing reverse proxy is in scope until IBM says otherwise. Locking down the LMI is good practice anyway, but don't count on it to close these two.
What IBM fixed, and the version trap
There's one fix pack for each product line. Verify Identity Access goes to 11.0.3.2 (fix pack 11.0.3-ISS-IVIA-FP0002 on Fix Central), and Security Verify Access goes to 10.0.9.4 (10.0.9-ISS-ISVA-FP0004). If you run containers, you pull the matching image tags from IBM's registry instead. Either way, you get all 22 fixes in one go.
The flaws that matter most in IBM's bulletin
Anyone who can reach the gateway can run their own code on it, without logging in. IBM gives both 9.8, so these are the two to worry about first.
An ordinary user login is enough here. Extra arguments slipped into a command let them run commands in one case, and do things they shouldn't in the other. Both 8.8.
Someone with no login can write files outside the folder they should be stuck in. It scores 7.5, and on a gateway a planted file is a foothold.
Audit log forgery. Low score at 2.7, but it means logs on an unpatched box are harder to trust.
Now the trap. The CVE descriptions say versions up to 10.0.9.2 and 11.0.3 are affected, and the public CVE records list 11.0.3.1 and 10.0.9.3 as the fixed releases. The bulletin's own table says something different: affected goes up to 11.0.3.1 and 10.0.9.3, and the fix links point to 11.0.3.2 and 10.0.9.4. IBM last modified the bulletin a few days after publishing it, and its change history doesn't say why the numbers differ.
IBM's container page backs the higher numbers. The 11.0.3.1 and 10.0.9.3 images are marked no longer available, and 11.0.3.2 and 10.0.9.4 are listed as the current tags. So if a scanner or a tracker tells you 11.0.3.1 is safe, don't stop there. Go to 11.0.3.2 or 10.0.9.4, and check that the version on the box actually says so afterwards.
| What you run | Fix | Watch out for |
|---|---|---|
| Verify Identity Access appliance 11.0 to 11.0.3.1 | 11.0.3.2 (11.0.3-ISS-IVIA-FP0002) | Earlier 11.0.x releases also have to reach 11.0.3.2 |
| Security Verify Access appliance 10.0 to 10.0.9.3 | 10.0.9.4 (10.0.9-ISS-ISVA-FP0004) | Virtual and container 10.0.x need Extended Support, so check your contract covers it |
| Verify Identity Access containers | icr.io/ivia images tagged 11.0.3.2 | 11.0.3.1 images are no longer available. Pin to 11.0.3.2, not latest |
| Security Verify Access containers | icr.io/isva images tagged 10.0.9.4 | 10.0.9.3 images are no longer available |
| ISAM 9.0 or anything out of support | No fix from IBM | IBM's bulletin doesn't say these are safe. Plan a move to 11.0.3.2 |
Versions, support and this bulletin
- Apr 2022ISAM 9.0.x support ends
- Dec 2024Verify Identity Access 11.0 released
Security Verify Access renamed.
- Jan 2025Security Verify Access 10.0.9 released
- Apr 30, 202610.0.x moves to Extended Support
- Jun 2026Verify Identity Access 11.0.3 released
- Oct 7, 2026IBM bulletin published
22 CVEs, fixes in 11.0.3.2 and 10.0.9.4.
- Oct 12, 2026Bulletin last modified
- Apr 30, 202910.0.x Extended Support ends
Older 10.0 releases are a separate problem. IBM's support table says fixes for 10.0.8 and earlier come only in the current patched release. An appliance on 10.0.6 has no 10.0.6 fix to wait for. It has to climb to 10.0.9.4, and the jump can pull in prerequisites you skipped years ago.
IBM's bulletin also carries a line worth reading slowly. The affected list only covers versions still in support, and leaving a version off the list doesn't mean IBM has decided it's unaffected. Any ISAM 9.0 box still running in a corner gets no fix at all. Assume it's exposed, keep it off the internet and plan its replacement.
What to do now
What to do now, by who you are
- Ask IT or your provider whether any customer or staff portal signs in through IBM Verify, ISAM or WebSEAL.
- If yes, ask for the version on every box and a date for 11.0.3.2 or 10.0.9.4, in writing.
- Check whether your support contract covers 10.0.x on Extended Support. If it lapsed, the fix pack may be out of reach.
- Ask who looks at the logs afterwards. A patch closes the hole but doesn't prove nobody used it.
- Write down every appliance and container, test and DR boxes too, with the exact version and fix pack each one runs. That list is what you'll patch from.
- Snapshot and download support files, then apply 11.0.3-ISS-IVIA-FP0002 or 10.0.9-ISS-ISVA-FP0004.
- Patch the internet-facing reverse proxies first, then the internal ones and the management nodes.
- Confirm the new version on each box after the reboot. Don't trust the change ticket.
- Find every pod that pulls from icr.io/ivia or icr.io/isva. The config and runtime containers count too, so don't stop at the proxy.
- Pin manifests and Helm values to 11.0.3.2 or 10.0.9.4. A latest tag tells you nothing in an audit.
- Check image signatures with policy.json or skopeo before the rollout. IBM signs every image, so a failed check means stop.
- Roll out and check no old pods survive in a forgotten namespace.
- Start forwarding appliance and container logs to your SIEM if you don't already. Logs that stay on an unpatched box are easier to doctor.
- Review LMI admin accounts, recent policy and junction changes, and new federation partners against change tickets.
- Look for outbound connections from the gateway to anything that isn't a backend app, directory or IBM.
- Record the patch date per box. Auditors will ask for it.
If you can only check one thing today, check the version string on each box against the table above. Include DR nodes and test boxes, which are easy to leave off the list and tend to fall furthest behind.
# example output. Run it in each cluster: the image list shows what's really deployed, whatever the ticket says kubectl get pods -A -o jsonpath='{range .items[*]}{.metadata.namespace}{" "}{.spec.containers[*].image}{"\n"}{end}' | grep -E 'icr.io/(ivia|isva)' iam-prod icr.io/ivia/ivia-wrp:11.0.3.1 iam-prod icr.io/ivia/ivia-runtime:11.0.3.2 iam-dr icr.io/isva/verify-access-wrp:10.0.9.2_IF2 # Both namespaces still run images below the fix. The DR copy is the one nobody would have noticed
The patch order that keeps sign-in working
- 01Inventory
Every appliance and cluster, with version, fix pack, who owns it and whether it faces the internet. Include DR and test.
- 02Back up
Take a snapshot and download full support files on each appliance. For containers, export the configuration snapshot. If the update fails, you'll want both.
- 03Shrink exposure while you wait
Keep the LMI on an admin network only, and remove internet exposure from any gateway that doesn't need it. This doesn't fix the flaws. It just shrinks who can try them.
- 04Patch the edge first
Take one node out of the load balancer, apply the fix pack, test sign-in, MFA and a federation login, then move to the next. Do internal nodes after the edge.
- 05Check and record
Read the version back on each node, compare it to 11.0.3.2 or 10.0.9.4, and record it with the date. Then review admin accounts and recent configuration changes.
Harden so the next one hurts less
This bulletin follows a pattern worth planning for. A gateway product with a long history will keep getting fix packs that bundle a lot of CVEs at once. The goal is that the next bulletin costs you a rolling patch night and a log review, and nothing more.
Before: one box at the edge does everything
The gateway faces the internet, its admin console is reachable from the same network, and its logs stay on the box.
After: patched, split up and watched
A WAF filters traffic, the LMI only answers on the admin network, secrets rotate, and logs leave the box as they're written.
- The LMI answers on the same network as user traffic, so anyone who reaches the proxy can try the console too
- Fix packs go in twice a year, with the upgrade project
- Images pulled as latest, so nobody knows what's running
- LDAP bind passwords and signing keys were set at install. Nobody has changed them since
- Logs read on the appliance when something breaks
- The LMI or config container only answers on an admin network
- Gateway fix packs have an emergency change path. Someone tests each one on a spare node first
- Pinned image tags and signature checks in the pipeline
- Bind passwords and keys sit in a vault. There's a runbook for rotating them
- Logs forwarded to a SIEM as they're written, kept for months
Two of these do most of the work. Keeping the admin console off the user network means a gateway bug can't hand someone the console as well. Getting logs off the box means an attacker who forges or deletes local entries leaves a gap in the SIEM that someone will notice.
The third fix is about time. Teams on 10.0.x virtual appliances or containers need Extended SupportdefinitionIBM's paid support once a release's normal support has ended. Security Verify Access 10.0.x moved onto it in April 2026, except on hardware appliances, so check your contract still covers you. now, and that ends in April 2029. Hardware appliances follow the hardware's own support dates. Each bulletin on that line is a reminder that the 11.0 move has to happen anyway. Planning it now, with a rehearsal on a copy of production, costs less than running it as an emergency during the next critical bulletin.
If you've been breached
If you find signs someone got in
IBM hasn't published indicators of compromise, so you're hunting for anything that doesn't match your own change records. Work through these in order, and don't rotate secrets while an attacker could still read the new ones.
- 01Containfirst hour
- Take the suspect node out of the load balancer and keep a snapshot before any change or reboot.
- Block its outbound traffic except to what the investigation needs.
- Save every log you have off the box: SIEM, load balancer, WAF and firewall.
- Open a severity 1 case with IBM Support and quote the bulletin's CVEs.
- 02Investigatefirst days
- Compare the configuration snapshot with your last known good one: junctions, policies, admin accounts, federation partners and keys.
- Look in the backend apps for sessions or users the gateway vouched for that nobody can explain.
- Check what the gateway's bind account changed in the directory. It should only ever read.
- Don't take the on-box audit log at its word. CVE-2026-11939 lets someone forge entries, so start from the copies you forwarded.
- 03Rebuilddays 1 to 3
- Build a fresh node or container on 11.0.3.2 or 10.0.9.4 instead of cleaning the old one.
- Restore configuration from a snapshot taken before the suspected break-in, then recheck every admin account and junction.
- 04Rotateafter the rebuild
- Rotate the LDAP bind password, junction credentials and any API keys the gateway held.
- Replace signing and encryption keys for federation and tokens, and tell SAML and OIDC partners about the new certificates.
- End all live user sessions so nothing issued by the old gateway survives.
- 05Report and learnfirst week
- Bring in legal early. A sign-in gateway sees personal data and passwords, so you might owe someone a notice, and that clock usually starts when you find out.
- Tell your insurer early. Most cyber policies have a notice window.
- Close the gaps it exposed: admin console on the user network, logs on the box, slow patch path.
A note on keys, because they're easy to forget. The gateway signs SAML assertions and tokens that partner systems trust. If someone had code running on it, they may have copied those keys, and a copied key keeps working after the patch. Rotating them means coordinating with every federation partner, so start the list on day one.
What this could look like: three typical setups
What this could look like: three typical setups
- the setup
- A regional insurer runs Security Verify Access 10.0.7 virtual appliances in front of its policyholder portal. Fix packs go in with the yearly upgrade, and the LMI is reachable from the DMZ.
- what happens
- The appliances face the internet and sit below 10.0.9.4, and there's no 10.0.7 fix. The team has to jump two releases under pressure, and the old upgrade notes are scattered across tickets.
- what to do
- Take snapshots and support files, check the 10.0.x upgrade prerequisites, and move to 10.0.9.4 one node at a time. Move the LMI to an admin network. Then plan the 11.0 move before 2029.
- the setup
- A bank runs the WRP, runtime and config containers in OpenShift, pulled as 11.0.3.1 after reading the CVE record. The security scanner shows green.
- what happens
- The scanner trusted the CVE record's fixed version. IBM's bulletin and container page put the fix at 11.0.3.2, so the pods are still below it.
- what to do
- Pin every Verify image to 11.0.3.2, verify signatures, roll out and check no 11.0.3.1 pod is left in another namespace. Tell the scanner team why the record was wrong.
- the setup
- An agency runs 11.0.3 appliances behind a WAF. The LMI only answers on an admin VLAN, logs go to the SIEM, and gateway fix packs have their own emergency change path.
- what happens
- The flaws are still there until patching, but every request is logged and the console isn't exposed. The team patches one node per night without a sign-in outage.
- what to do
- Apply 11.0.3-ISS-IVIA-FP0002 in rolling order, confirm versions, review admin and federation changes in the SIEM since the bulletin, and file the record for auditors.
These three are made up, and none is a real incident or a Cohash client. Each one gets the same fix pack from IBM. How it goes depends on where they started, mostly how far behind they were and whether anyone outside could reach the console.
How Cohash helps
We work on IBM Verify estates, from ISAM and Security Verify Access appliances to Verify Identity Access in containers. On a bulletin like this one we start with the inventory and the version table, then patch the edge in a rolling order that keeps sign-in up. After that we review admin and federation changes. If you're on 10.0.x, we can plan the 11.0 move from the configuration you actually run. The platform page is /tools/ibm-security-verify, engineers are at /tools/ibm-security-verify#hire, and /assessment is the place to start a review.
What to take from this
- 01
Move Verify Identity Access to 11.0.3.2 and Security Verify Access to 10.0.9.4. IBM lists no workaround.
- 02
Ignore trackers that call 11.0.3.1 or 10.0.9.3 fixed. IBM's bulletin and container page put the fix one step higher.
- 03
Patch internet-facing reverse proxies first, one node at a time, and read the version back afterwards.
- 04
Older 10.0 releases get no fix of their own. They have to climb to 10.0.9.4, prerequisites and all.
- 05
Keep the admin console off the user network and the logs off the box, so the next bulletin costs a patch night.
- 06
If you suspect a break-in, rebuild first and rotate bind passwords and signing keys after.
01Am I affected by CVE-2026-78406?
Yes, if you run Verify Identity Access below 11.0.3.2 or Security Verify Access below 10.0.9.4, on an appliance or in containers. Someone who can reach it over the network could run code on it without logging in. There's no workaround from IBM, so you'll have to install the fix pack.
02Is 11.0.3.1 enough?
No. Some CVE records and trackers still call 11.0.3.1 and 10.0.9.3 fixed. IBM's bulletin, as last modified, lists both as affected and points to 11.0.3.2 and 10.0.9.4. IBM's container page also marks the 11.0.3.1 and 10.0.9.3 builds as no longer available, so go one step higher.
03Are these flaws being exploited?
Nobody had reported it when we checked. The flaws aren't in CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog, and CISA's assessment in the CVE records rates exploitation as none. It also rates them automatable with total impact, which is why waiting for an exploit is a bad bet.
04We're still on ISAM 9.0. Is there a patch?
No. ISAM 9.0.x support ended in April 2022, and IBM's bulletin says leaving a version off the affected list doesn't mean it's unaffected. Keep it off the internet and plan a move to Verify Identity Access 11.0.3.2.
05Will blocking access to the LMI protect us until we patch?
It helps, but don't rely on it. IBM hasn't said which interface carries the two code execution flaws, and the reverse proxy faces users by design. Restrict the LMI anyway and patch the edge nodes first.
06A provider runs our sign-in portal, so we never touch it. What should we ask them?
Ask whether it runs on IBM Verify, ISAM or WebSEAL, which version each node is on, and the date they'll reach 11.0.3.2 or 10.0.9.4. Then ask who reviews admin and configuration changes after the patch.
07Does this affect IBM Verify SaaS?
The bulletin doesn't say. It only names Verify Identity Access and Security Verify Access, on appliances and in containers. If you also use a hosted IBM Verify service, ask IBM about it directly and don't assume either way.
Three questions, about a minute
Pick an answer and we'll tell you if it's right, and why it is or isn't. The score stays in this browser.
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Q1Your scanner marks the Verify Identity Access pods on 11.0.3.1 as fixed, and the change ticket is closed. What now?
show the answer
B. Move them to 11.0.3.2, which IBM's bulletin and container page give as the fix The CVE record names 11.0.3.1, but IBM's bulletin, as last modified, lists 11.0.3.1 as affected and links the fix to 11.0.3.2. The 11.0.3.1 images are no longer available.
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Q2A forgotten appliance turns up running Security Verify Access 10.0.6. Where does its fix come from, if anywhere?
show the answer
D. It has to move up to 10.0.9.4, the current patched release on that line IBM only fixes 10.0.8 and older by way of the current patched release. So a 10.0.6 box has to climb all the way to 10.0.9.4, and someone should check the upgrade prerequisites first.
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Q3You suspect a gateway was used before you patched it. When do you rotate the bind password and signing keys?
show the answer
A. After the node is rebuilt on a fixed version Someone still on the box can read new secrets as easily as old ones, and on-box logs can be forged on an unpatched node. Rebuild first, then rotate and tell federation partners.