SecurityPrivileged access

Delinea Secret Server login bypass: why 12.2.7 won't save you from this 9.9

Delinea rescored a Secret Server flaw to CVSS 9.9: no password, no account. Version 12.2.7 is affected too. Who needs 12.3.000002, how to upgrade, and what to check in your logs.

Cohash Security Practice November 2026 18 min read 7 chapters 3-question check
part 30 of 30 · Platform releases, explained from scratch
01 Login page 02 Secret Server 12.2.7 or earlier 03 Any adminaccount 04 Fence andupgrade

the ideaNo password, just a PIN: fence the login, go to 12.3.000002, read the logs.

after reading, you can
  • Work out whether your Secret Server is exposed, even if you upgraded to 12.2.7 for the September flaws
  • Plan the move to 12.3.000002, and spot what can catch you out once it's done
  • Check audit history and mail logs for PIN activity that nobody on your team can explain

Delinea has published three new flaws in self-hosted Secret Server, and on November 5 it raised the worst one to a CVSSdefinitionHow bad a security flaw is, from 0 to 10. Version 4 also tells you if an attacker needs a login, or if special conditions have to be in place. score of 9.9. If you run Secret Server on your own servers at 12.2.7 or earlier, upgrade to 12.3.000002 now, and fence off the login page until you have. That includes anyone who moved to 12.2.7 for the September flaws.

in plain wordsCritical: upgrade on-prem now

Your password vault may let someone in who doesn't know a password. Upgrade it now.

Secret Server is where IT teams keep their most powerful passwords: domain admins, database owners, service accounts. To get in, you normally type a password and then prove who you are a second way, often with a short code. Delinea says that on older self-hosted versions, someone could trigger that code for any account without logging in, skip the password step and sign in with the second factor alone. We found no public report of attacks so far. But the way in looks simple, and what's behind it is the keys to the rest of the company, so this one shouldn't wait for the monthly patch window.

think of it like this

Think of an office with two checks. A guard looks at your badge, then your phone gets a code for the inner door. This flaw is a side corridor nobody meant to build: a stranger skips the guard, walks up to that door, asks for a code in any employee's name and keeps trying.

who should care
  • Teams running Secret Server on-prem
  • PAM and identity admins
  • Security and incident response
  • Owners whose MSP runs the vault
  • Anyone who just moved to 12.2.7
chapter 01

Why it matters to you

Whoever signs in to the vault as an admin can usually read the domain admin password, and from there reach almost anything else on the network. That's why a login bypass on a PAM vault is worse than the same bug on most other apps. The score tells you how Delinea sees it now: reachable over the network, easy to pull off, no account needed and no help from a user.

9.9CVSS v4 score for CVE-2026-115829 after the November 5 change
8.7Score the same CVE carried when it was first published on October 30
12.3.1Fixed on-prem version in Delinea's advisory (12.3.000001 in the notes)
NoneKnown exploitation in CISA's record, checked before the rescore

The rescoredefinitionWhen a vendor changes the severity of a flaw after publishing it. Tools and tickets that copied the first number can stay out of date. is the part most people will miss. When these CVEs first went public on October 30, the worst was 8.7 and the record said an attacker already needed high privileges, which reads like an insider problem you can schedule for later. Six days later Delinea changed that to no privileges at all, gave the flaw a blunter title and rewrote its description. If your scanner or ticket copied the first record, it may still show 8.7, and the ticket may be sitting in the wrong queue.

On attacks, the picture is calm for now, with one caveat. The CISA catalog of known exploited flaws doesn't list any of the three (we checked catalog 2026.11.04), Delinea's advisory doesn't mention attacks, and we found no public exploit code. CISA's own note on the record says exploitation none and automatable no, but CISA wrote that on October 30, before the rescore. Secret Server also has some history here: after a 2024 login bypass, a security engineer's public write-up included a proof-of-concept exploit. So don't plan around this staying quiet.

how the attack worksHow the login bypass works, step by stepBuilt from the CVE record and Delinea's advisory. Delinea hasn't published technical details, so we keep the middle steps general on purpose.
  1. 01 The attacker reaches the login page

    Going by the score, reaching Secret Server over the network is enough. They don't need an account, and nobody on your side has to click a thing.

  2. 02 A PIN gets generated for any account

    The attacker picks an account, any account. The CVE record says a two-factor pin code could be generated for it with no prior login.

  3. 03 The password step gets skipped

    Normally the password comes first. Here the attacker can bypass that step and go straight to the second factor, so a strong password doesn't help.

  4. 04 They get the second factor right

    Delinea's title for the flaw names brute force, so expect repeated guessing here. It hasn't said how many tries that takes.

  5. 05 They're in as that user

    The attacker now has whatever that person can see. Depending on roles and permissions, that can include stored passwords, launchers and settings.

For engineers, a few details help. The weakness class is CWE-288, an authentication bypass through an alternate path or channel, which MITRE describes as a product that requires authentication but has another route that doesn't. Delinea's advisory text is thinner than its CVE record: the advisory's title names PIN reset and brute force, but its description only says a user could skip the first step by negotiating the second factordefinitionWhat you show after your password, usually an emailed code or a security key. In this flaw it's the only step the attacker has to pass.. The record adds the unauthenticated PIN generation. Neither says which second factor methods are in play.

Here's our own reading, so treat it as that. Secret Server uses the words "pin code" for its email second factor, where it mails a six-digit code. That makes email PIN users the obvious place to look first, but Delinea hasn't confirmed it. Don't assume you're safe because your admins use something else. Lockout is unclear too: Delinea's docs say each wrong PIN counts toward the Maximum Login Failures limit in a normal sign-in, but nobody has said whether this path respects that counter.

chapter 02

What Delinea fixed, and the other two CVEs

All three flaws share one fix, and there's no hotfix or workaround listed for any of them. The advisory's only resolution is to upgrade to on-prem 12.3.1. Older hotfix builds from the September round don't help, since every version up to and including 12.2.7 is listed as affected.

The three CVEs, and what they do

fixedThe main flaw: skip the password step. Then only the code is left

CVE-2026-115829, CVSS v4 9.9. Someone with no login could get a two-factor PIN generated for any account, skip the first step and sign in with the second factor. That's the one to worry about first.

fixedThe FIDO2 flaw: the PIN or fingerprint didn't always get checked

CVE-2026-115828. Secret Server didn't always validate the PIN or biometric check on a FIDO2 device. CVSS v4 9.4, but the score says the attack is harder and needs certain conditions to be present.

fixedThe JWT flaw: sometimes a token with no signature returns cloudadmin

CVE-2026-115830, CVSS v4 8.7. Under certain conditions, a user could submit an unsigned JWT and get cloudadmin permissions back. Its score still says high privileges are needed. Our reading: think insider or stolen admin account.

tableTwo of the three scores moved on November 5. Trust the current record, and check your tickets against it.
CVEScore on Oct 30Score on Nov 5Privileges the score assumes now
CVE-2026-1158298.79.9None
CVE-2026-1158285.19.4None, with harder conditions
CVE-2026-1158308.78.7High

A word on the 115828 jump, from 5.1 to 9.4. Our reading is that it's the less urgent of the two critical scores, because the score says the attack is harder and depends on specific conditions. A FIDO2definitionWhat sits behind hardware security keys like a YubiKey. You touch the key, and it can ask for its own PIN or your fingerprint first. key is meant to prove someone is holding it and knows its PIN or has the right fingerprint, so if that check is skipped, a lost or stolen key is worth more than it should be. That last step is our reading of the description. Delinea hasn't spelled it out.

tableWhere each version stands on these three CVEs
Your versionStatusWhat to do
12.3.000002FixedStay here, or move to a later build when one ships.
12.3.000001 (12.3.1)FixedMove to .000002 if anyone signs in with Windows authentication and two-factor. The first build sent them back to the login page.
12.2.7AffectedUpgrade. This was the safe target for the September CVEs, and it isn't any more.
12.1.3, 12.0.23, 11.9.48, 11.8.2, 11.7.62 hotfixesAffectedUpgrade. These also stay open to the September SAML or padding oracle flaws.
Below 11.9.000025AffectedPlan a step upgrade through 11.9.000006, and confirm the path with Delinea support.
Secret Server CloudNot listedNothing to install. Delinea lists all three for the on-prem product only.

How it unfolded

  1. Aug 28, 2026
    12.2.000007 released

    This closed the September flaws, so it looked like a safe place to stop. It's also the newest build these new flaws affect.

  2. Oct 21, 2026
    12.3.000001 released

    The fix is out, but the notes don't name any CVE, so few people would've known to rush.

  3. Oct 23, 2026
    12.3.000002 maintenance build

    Fixes the sign-in loop for Windows authentication users with two-factor. If that's your setup, skip straight to this build.

  4. Oct 30, 2026
    Three CVEs published

    The worst gets an 8.7 and reads as if it needs high privileges, so it wouldn't have looked like a rush job.

  5. Nov 2, 2026
    Notice on Delinea's trust portal

    The notice still calls it a "partial login bypass". That name won't set off many alarms.

  6. Nov 5, 2026
    Scores and wording change

    CVE-2026-115829 jumps to 9.9 with no privileges needed and CVE-2026-115828 to 9.4. Older tickets may now be wrong.

chapter 03

What to do now

What to do now, by who you are

Business ownertoday
  • Ask IT or your managed service provider: do we run Delinea Secret Server, and is it their cloud or our own servers?
  • If it's your own servers, get the exact version number in writing. Anything at 12.2.7 or below needs the upgrade.
  • Ask for an upgrade date this week, and for who approves the emergency change.
Secret Server adminsthis week
  • Read the version off every instance, including disaster recovery replicas and test servers holding real secrets.
  • Block the login page from the internet today, and let only staff networks or VPN reach it until the upgrade is done.
  • Back up the database and application folder first. Keep encryption.config unencrypted in that backup, then upgrade to 12.3.000002.
  • Bring engines and the Protocol Handler up to the 12.3 versions, then test every sign-in method you use.
Security teamthis week
  • Any ticket raised before November 5 probably has the wrong severity. Re-open it and bump it to match the 9.9.
  • Pull user audit history for admins: look for LOGIN FAILED INVALID TWOFACTOR runs and ACCOUNTLOCKEDFAILEDATTEMPTS events.
  • Compare mail server logs for "[SecretServer] Pin Code" messages against real sign-ins, since sends aren't audited.
  • Ask admins whether they've had PIN emails they didn't ask for. It's a cheap question and a useful signal.

Those email checks come from how Delinea documents the normal flow, and they're the cheapest early warning you have. A user with email two-factor who signs in fully gets two LOGIN SUCCESS events in a row, one per phase. A PIN that gets emailed leaves no audit event, only the attempt to use it does, so your SMTP logs are where you'd see the send. Nobody has confirmed that this flaw's path sends email at all. A lone success with no password phase in front of it deserves a question. That pattern is our inference and Delinea hasn't published indicators, so a clean result doesn't prove nothing happened.

hunt-in-siem: example searches we'd run first on forwarded logsexample output
# example output. Event names come from Delinea's email 2FA docs; field names vary by SIEM, so match them to yours
# 1. Wrong PINs on one account, or across many accounts from one address
source = secret-server-audit and action = "LOGIN FAILED INVALID TWOFACTOR" | count by user, ip, 10m
# 2. Accounts locked by failures. Look hard at admins nobody says were locked out
source = secret-server-audit and action = "ACCOUNTLOCKEDFAILEDATTEMPTS" | table time user
# 3. PIN emails sent. Check them against real sign-ins, since only the mail server sees a send
source = smtp and subject = "[SecretServer] Pin Code" | table time recipient # any send with no matching sign-in?

The emergency upgrade order

  1. 01
    Fence first

    Restrict the login page to staff networks or VPN at the firewall or load balancer. Delinea doesn't list this as a mitigation, but the score assumes network reach, so it takes most outsiders off the board while you prepare.

  2. 02
    Find every instance

    Production, DR replicas, test and that old pilot server nobody turned off. Read the version from each one, because the change ticket may be wrong.

  3. 03
    Back up the right things

    Save the Secret Server database and the application folder on every web node, with unencrypted copies of encryption.config and database.config. Delinea's checklist says not to proceed without them and suggests planning about two hours.

  4. 04
    Step if you have to

    Delinea's 12.2.000007 notes say versions before 11.9.000025 must go to 11.9.000006 first, and that offline installs skipping it fail an integrity check. The 12.3 notes don't repeat this, so confirm the path with support if you're that far back.

  5. 05
    Upgrade to 12.3.000002

    Don't stop at 12.2.7 or at 12.3.000001. Then bring the engines, session-recording agent and Protocol Handler up to the versions listed for 12.3.

  6. 06
    Test what could break

    Sign in with each method you use, launch a recorded session, run a rotation and run your API scripts. Then look at your first domain sync and any large AD discovery scan.

  7. 07
    Then hunt

    With the hole closed, go through the audit and mail logs. The fix came out October 21 and the CVE records came out October 30, but older exposure can't be ruled out, so look back as far as your logs go.

chapter 04

Harden so the next one hurts less

This is the second round of critical Secret Server login flaws in about two months. September's FIDO2 and SAML bypasses got fixed in 12.2.7, and here we are telling you 12.2.7 isn't enough. So the durable fix is a vault that can take an emergency upgrade quickly, with a login page few people can reach.

before

Before: the vault's login answers anyone

Anyone who can load the login page can start this attack, and Delinea's docs say email PIN sends have no audit event in the vault.

Before: the vault's login answers anyone Anyone who can load the login page can start this attack, and Delinea's docs say email PIN sends have no audit event in the vault. 01 · OUTSIDE 02 · SECRET SERVER 03 · TARGETS PIN, no password reads secrets admin passwords opens sessions Attacker no account Web login 12.2.7 or earlier SQL database every secret Domain admins stored passwords Servers launched sessions © Cohash · cohash.com
01 · OUTSIDE02 · SECRET SERVER03 · TARGETS Attacker: no account Attacker no account Web login: 12.2.7 or earlier Web login 12.2.7 or earlier SQL database: every secret SQL database every secret Domain admins: stored passwords Domain admins stored passwords Servers: launched sessions Servers launched sessions PIN, no password admin passwords opens sessions © Cohash · cohash.com
after

After: patched, fenced and watched

Only staff networks reach the login, and failed second factors and PIN emails land somewhere a person looks.

After: patched, fenced and watched Only staff networks reach the login, and failed second factors and PIN emails land somewhere a person looks. 01 · ACCESS 02 · SECRET SERVER 03 · WATCHING staff only reads secrets login events VPN or zero trust staff networks only De 12.3.000002 login not public SQL database every secret SIEM audit and SMTP logs © Cohash · cohash.com
01 · ACCESS02 · SECRET SERVER03 · WATCHING VPN or zero trust: staff networks only VPN or zero trust staff networks only 12.3.000002: login not public 12.3.000002 login not public SQL database: every secret SQL database every secret SIEM: audit and SMTP logs SIEM audit and SMTP logs staff only login events © Cohash · cohash.com
side by sideSame vault, two setups. Only one of them copes when the next advisory drops
Usual setup
  • Remote staff asked for internet access once, and the login has been open ever since
  • Someone set the severity from the first CVE record, and nobody looked again
  • Vault upgrades wait for the normal quarterly change window
  • Nobody reads PIN emails or failed second factors until an auditor asks for them
Hardened setup
  • Login reachable only through VPN or zero trust access
  • Someone re-reads the live CVE record for each open vault flaw until its ticket closes
  • A rehearsed emergency upgrade path, with backups and rollback already written down
  • Second-factor failures and lockouts alert, and someone owns the alert

Also look at how many people hold admin roles in the vault, because this flaw lets an attacker choose whose account to target. A short list of named admins, with break-glass accounts sealed and watched, makes the worst case smaller. It also makes the audit review possible in an afternoon.

chapter 05

If you've been breached

If you find a sign-in nobody can explain

Work through these in order. Save the evidence before you change anything, and don't rotate passwords until the attacker's access is gone, or they may simply read the new ones.

  1. 01Containfirst hour
    • Cut the login page off from everything except a small admin network at the firewall.
    • Back up the database, application folder with encryption.config, audit data, and IIS and SMTP logs before changing anything.
    • Disable the affected Secret Server accounts, but leave them in place so the audit trail stays.
    • Open a priority case with Delinea support and cite the CVE numbers.
  2. 02Investigatefirst days
    • Go through the audit history of each affected account and list every secret viewed, checked out or launched, with times.
    • Trace launched RDP and SSH sessions to the servers they reached, and check those for new accounts or tasks.
    • Look for changes nobody asked for: new users, changed roles, API settings and folder permissions.
    • Write down every credential those accounts could reach. That list is your worst case.
  3. 03Removeday 1 to 2
    • Upgrade to 12.3.000002 before letting anyone back in.
    • Run Reset Two-Factor Authentication on affected users. Just disabling FIDO2 won't do, since Delinea says that keeps the device registered.
    • Remove any accounts, roles or settings the attacker added. Check twice, since one leftover admin role undoes the rest.
  4. 04Recoverweek 1
    • Rotate every credential on the worst-case list, starting with domain admins and service accounts.
    • Rebuild any server you can't confidently clean, then bring users back in small groups.
    • Watch logs closely for the following weeks in case the attacker kept another way in.
  5. 05Report and learnas required
    • Bring in legal counsel and your cyber insurer early. They'll help decide who has to be told and by when.
    • Tell regulators and clients if your obligations say you must. Write down what you knew and when, because someone will ask.
    • Write up what actually helped and what didn't, the fence and logs included. Then fix the gaps while people still care.
chapter 06

What this could look like

Three typical setups

01 Internet 02 12.2.7 login open to the web 03 Admin account 04 12.3.000002 plus a fence
scenario 01High risk
A company that just moved to 12.2.7
the setup
A regional insurer upgraded its on-prem vault to 12.2.7 to close the earlier flaws, then closed the ticket. Remote admins still reach the login over the open internet.
what happens
The October 30 record looked like a high-privilege problem, so the new ticket went in the next quarterly window. After November 5 the same flaw needs no login at all, and nothing prompted anyone to look again.
what to do
Fence the login today, move to 12.3.000002 this week and raise the ticket's severity. Then check admin audit history and mail logs.
01 12.3.000001 CVEs fixed 02 Sign-in loop Windows auth + 2FA 03 12.3.000002
scenario 02Medium risk
A manufacturer already on 12.3.000001
the setup
A manufacturer took 12.3.000001 as soon as it came out, for other reasons. Staff use Windows authentication and Duo, and now the help desk keeps hearing about login loops.
what happens
These three flaws are fixed on this build. The loop is the separate bug Delinea fixed two days later, and until it's gone people may push for risky shortcuts such as turning off two-factor.
what to do
Move to 12.3.000002 and keep two-factor on. Run the log review anyway, covering the time before the upgrade.
01 Firm owner 02 MSP's vault which version? 03 Written answer
scenario 03High risk
A small firm whose MSP runs the vault
the setup
A 60-person accounting firm has its passwords in Secret Server, run by a managed service provider. The owner doesn't know the version or where it's hosted.
what happens
If it's the provider's own install at 12.2.7 or below, this applies, and one breached vault could affect every client on it. If it's Delinea's cloud service, there's nothing to install.
what to do
Email the provider today. Ask for the version in writing, the upgrade date and whether they've reviewed sign-ins to your accounts.
chapter 07

How Cohash helps

We implement and upgrade Delinea Secret Server, including the step upgrades, distributed engines and launchers that make these jobs slow. If you want a second pair of hands for the move to 12.3.000002, or a review of who can reach what in your vault afterwards, start with our Delinea page, look at Delinea engineers you can bring in, or take the free assessment to see where your privileged access stands.

key takeaways

What to take from this

  1. 01

    Self-hosted Secret Server at 12.2.7 or earlier needs 12.3.000002. No hotfix or workaround is listed.

  2. 02

    Check the live CVE record. Delinea moved this flaw from 8.7 to 9.9 six days after publishing it, so old tickets may be wrong.

  3. 03

    Fence the login page today. It costs little and it doesn't depend on the change window.

  4. 04

    Delinea's docs say email PIN sends have no audit event, so pull mail server logs alongside user audit history.

  5. 05

    We found no public reports of attacks yet, and a clean log review doesn't prove nothing happened.

platforms in this noteDelinea →
fact-checked November 2026 against vendor and official documentation · where to go next
  1. How Cohash delivers Delinea: scope, roles and architecture
  2. Hire vetted Delinea engineers
  3. Privileged access management
  4. Book a 30-minute working session with a senior engineer
01Am I affected by CVE-2026-115829?

If you run Secret Server on your own servers at 12.2.7 or earlier, yes. That includes the September hotfix builds. Version 12.3.1 and later are fixed, and we'd take 12.3.000002.

02We upgraded to 12.2.7 last month. Do we have to upgrade again?

Yes. That upgrade closed the September flaws, but all three of these list 12.2.7 as affected. There's no hotfix for 12.2.7 in the advisory, so the way out is 12.3.

03Is 12.3.1 the same as 12.3.000001?

As far as we can tell, yes. The advisory says 12.3.1 and links the 12.3.000001 release notes. Go one further to 12.3.000002, because the first build sent Windows authentication users with two-factor back to the login page.

04We're on Secret Server Cloud. Do we have to do anything?

There's nothing to install. Delinea lists all three for the on-prem product, and it changed the CVE records on November 5 to say so. If you still have an old on-prem server from before the move, check that it's really off.

05Has anyone exploited this?

Nothing public so far. It isn't in CISA's catalog of known exploited flaws (catalog 2026.11.04), Delinea's advisory doesn't mention attacks and we found no public exploit code. CISA's note saying exploitation none dates from before the rescore, so keep checking.

06Why did the score jump from 8.7 to 9.9?

Delinea changed the record to say no privileges are needed and that the attack isn't complex. It also renamed the flaw and rewrote the description. Delinea hasn't published why it changed its assessment.

07Can we switch something off instead of upgrading?

The advisory lists no workaround. Limiting who can reach the login page cuts the risk while you prepare, but it's a stopgap of ours and it doesn't fix the flaw. Staff on those networks could still reach it.

08How long will the upgrade take?

Delinea's checklist suggests planning a change window of about two hours, and says your method, size and complexity determine the actual disruption to users. Older versions may need a step upgrade first, so read your version before you promise anyone a time.

next track

That's the end of this track.

Next up: running enterprise platforms well. ERP, CRM and ITSM work that holds up after go-live.

  1. 01HashiCorp Vault 2.2 explained: TPM login, post-quantum PKI and the October fixes
  2. 02Upgrading to SailPoint IdentityIQ 9.0: what breaks and what to fix first
  3. 03Terraform 1.17 explained: what's new, who it touches and how we'd upgrade
  4. 04BeyondTrust Remote Support zero-day: patch it, then check who got in
  5. 05Patch PHP and Node.js this week: what broke and who's exposed
  6. 06OpenShift support dates through 2027: which clusters run out first and how to plan the upgrades
  7. 07Oracle's October security patches: what to fix first in EBS, PeopleSoft and Access Manager
  8. 08Oracle Java drops four root certificates over eMudhra: patch, then test what breaks
  9. 09Delinea Secret Server auth bypass: why the FIDO2 hotfix isn't enough
  10. 10IBM Verify Access flaws let attackers run code without a login: patch to 11.0.3.2
  11. 11Foundry Workflows retire on December 1. We'd start moving yours to Agent Framework now
  12. 12Vertex AI is retiring text-embedding-005 and three other embedding models: how to re-embed before search breaks
  13. 13dbt drops v1.3 to v1.7 from its platform on January 31, 2027: get pinned jobs onto a release track before they're deleted
  14. 14Brotli CVE-2026-111497 is now on CISA's exploited list, and you probably run more copies than you think
  15. 15Auth0 moved the Rules and Hooks deadline: Hooks stop on 30 April 2027, Rules on 31 January 2028
  16. 16Still on Okta Classic Engine? Three features stop working on March 5, 2027, and two of them block the upgrade
  17. 17Patched GitLab, still exposed: the CI regex bug CISA lists as exploited, and the Ruby step people miss
  18. 18Patched Ivanti Connect Secure in October? Two more exploited bugs, and the AD cleanup
  19. 19Patch roundup, week of Oct 26: upgrade Secret Server today, then work down the list
  20. 20UiPath 2023.10 support has run out and 2024.10 is next. What we'd upgrade first
  21. 21Password Safe 24.3 runs out of support in December, and 26.3 is still one upgrade away
  22. 22Upgrade Entra Connect Sync before April 2027 and move users off Microsoft's SMS codes
  23. 23Chrome drops XSLT on 17 November. What breaks in InterSystems, and the fix for your version
  24. 24Agent Builder, Evals and saved prompts shut on 30 November. Here's what to pull out first
  25. 25BeyondTrust Remote Support and PRA 24.3 lose support in November, and there's no one-step upgrade
  26. 26OpenShift 4.19 is running out of support. Do you park on 4.22 or keep going to 5.0?
  27. 27Terraform Enterprise 2.1 moves VCS ingress into your agents. What to change before October 2027
  28. 28Mule 4.12 Edge leaves standard support this month. Upgrade to 4.13 before CloudHub does it for you
  29. 29RSA SecurID primary support ends in stages from December. Here's how you get to 8.9
  30. 30Delinea Secret Server login bypass: why 12.2.7 won't save you from this 9.9
all learning tracks →
Time to upgrade or move No newenvironments Suspended Decommission… Nov 2026 Oct 2027
Engineering · 15 minDataverse for Teams is going away: what to keep, move or let go before September 2027

Most teams still have time to upgrade or move their apps. After September they don't.

read next
next step

Tell us what you're running. We'll tell you what we'd do first.

A 30-minute working session with a senior engineer. No slides.

useful to bring
  • The platform and the version you're on
  • Where you need to get to, and by when
  • What's custom: rules, plugins, integrations
  • Any audit finding or deadline driving it