RSA SecurID primary support ends in stages from December. Here's how you get to 8.9
Older Windows agents and authenticators leave primary support in December, Authentication Manager 8.7 SP2 in January, more authenticators in March. Here's how to choose your route to 8.9, and what old hardware and old agents will do to your plan.
part 29 of 30 · Platform releases, explained from scratchthe ideaCheck hardware and agents first, then take the two upgrades to 8.9
after reading, you can- Work out which SecurID versions you still run that lose primary support before spring
- Pick the route out of 8.7 SP2 that fits your hardware, your agents and the time you've got left
- Spot the old hardware that'll stop an upgrade to 8.9 before you've booked anything
RSA's support clock runs out on several SecurID parts between now and March: some Windows agents and authenticators in December, Authentication ManagerdefinitionThe server you run yourself, on RSA hardware or as a virtual appliance. When someone types a SecurID code at the VPN, this is what checks it. 8.7 SP2 in January, and more authenticators in March. Find out this week which versions you run, because going from 8.7 SP2 to 8.9 takes two upgrades you can't undo, and an old appliance may not make the trip.
The server checking your VPN and Windows logins will soon be out of standard support
RSA SecurID is the second step at sign-in: the changing code from a token or app, or a tap on a phone. Authentication Manager is the server that checks those codes for VPNs, network gear and Windows logins. Agents are the small pieces of software that ask it. Each has its own version and its own end of primary support date, and several of those dates fall in the next five months. RSA's notices don't say anything switches off on the day. The trouble is fixes: quarterly patches already go only to the latest major release, and the date marks how long you've let that gap run.
Think of the company that services your building's door locks. They'll stop stocking parts for your model. The doors still open tomorrow, but when one fails or a flaw turns up, the answer is to replace the lock, and you'd rather do that before the failure than during it.
- CIOs and IT directors
- Identity and security teams
- VPN and network admins
- Windows desktop teams
- Help desk leads
Why these dates matter more than they look
The January date is the one with teeth. RSA's life cycle page says quarterly patches and updates only come out for the latest major release of Authentication Manager, and anything older may get a hotfix if RSA decides it's needed. So a version that's still inside its dates can already be off the main patch train.
Two recent advisories show what that means. RSA rates RSA-2026-15 critical and lists 8.7 SP2 Patch 7 or earlier as affected. It names fixed patches for 8.8 and 8.9, gives none for 8.7 SP2, and tells customers to move to the latest version. RSA-2026-17, also critical, is fixed in 8.9 Patch 5 and its Web Tier patch. Neither advisory says these specific flaws are being exploited, but both repeat Oracle's warning that attackers have succeeded against customers who didn't apply its patches. Your auditor will still ask why a critical advisory on your MFA server has no patch applied.
RSA gives months with no day, but its life cycle page says each date lands at the end of the stated month. Your real budget for December is the holiday change freeze, which arrives sooner than the date does.
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01 Date passes
Nobody notices at first. The version leaves primary support at the end of the month, and RSA's notices don't say logins stop.
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02 Patches aren't reaching you
Quarterly patches only go to the latest major release, so an older server may get a hotfix or a later patch, but RSA doesn't promise one.
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03 An advisory lands
RSA fixes a critical flaw on newer versions. Now your fix is an upgrade, and from 8.7 SP2 that can mean two of them.
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04 You upgrade in a hurry
Agents, RADIUS clients and old appliances get tested under pressure, on a system everybody needs to log in.
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05 Or you planned it
You've run the inventory, rehearsed the hops and swapped old agents first, so the cutover is a normal change window.
What runs out, and what replaces it
| Product | Version | End of primary support | What to do |
|---|---|---|---|
| Authentication Manager | 8.7 SP1 | June 2026 (passed) | Extended support runs to June 2027 or June 2028. Three hops to 8.9 |
| Authentication Manager | 8.7 SP2 | January 2027 | Extended support runs to January 2028 or January 2029. Two hops to 8.9 |
| Authentication Manager | 8.8 | April 2028 | Later date, but quarterly patches go to the latest major release |
| Authentication Manager | 8.9 | February 2028 | Latest major release. Get to Patch 5 or later |
| MFA Agent for Windows | 2.3.3, 2.3.4, 2.3.5 | December 2026 | Move to 2.5, listed with no end date yet |
| MFA Agent for Windows | 2.3.6 | August 2027 | Buys time, but plan the same move |
| MFA Agent for Windows | 2.4.x | March 2028 | If you hold 2.4.0 to 2.4.2, RSA has pulled them. Use 2.4.3 or later |
| Authenticator for Windows | 6.2.2 | December 2026 | Move to 6.2.7, listed with no end date yet |
| Authenticator for Windows | 6.2.3 | March 2027 | Same move. 6.2.4 ends May 2027 and 6.2.6 ends October 2027 |
| Authenticator for iOS, Android | 4.5 | October 2026 (passed) | Update through your app store or device management |
| Authenticator for iOS, Android | 4.6 | March 2027 | Move to 4.7. RSA lists 4.8 as coming soon |
The changes that catch people out
RSA removes this code matching setting with the March 2027 release and moves anyone still on it to Selection automatically. Users will see a different prompt, so warn the help desk.
Non-PFS TLS 1.2 cipher suites are off by default from 8.8. Older agents and integrated systems may not connect afterwards, so test them first.
8.8 Patch 3 disables the service the old Windows agent used to register DHCP machines. Those agents then fail with AGENT_AUTO_REG_START,23029,FAIL,NON_SSL_SOCKET.
RSA's 8.8 notes list Authentication Agent 7.4.x for Windows, 8.0.x Web for IIS and custom agents built on the Agent API 8.x as deprecated. They don't support TLS 1.3.
RSA says they may keep working on 8.8 and 8.9 but they're no longer supported. Don't count one as covered just because it still authenticates.
It still runs on 8.9, but RSA says it'll go in a future release. Check any scripts built on the SDK and plan on JDK 17, which is what RSA recommends.
One thing the notice doesn't tell you about Selection. RSA ties the change to NIST SP 800-63B-4, and NIST's text does rule out comparing codes and tapping approve. But the same passage says a list of codes to compare doesn't meet its requirement either, since someone can guess from a short list. What NIST asks for is transferring the code, such as typing it into the phone app. RSA's documentation also describes an Input method where the user enters the code.
So if your compliance team measures against 800-63B-4, don't take the automatic move as the end of the conversation. Ask them whether Selection satisfies them, and test Input with a pilot group. Typing a code is more work than tapping one, so the help desk will want warning either way.
The dates to plan around
- Jun 20268.7 SP1 primary support ended
If you're here, you're already on extended support or outside it.
- Oct 2026Authenticator 4.5 ended
Phones count too. Check them while you've got the inventory open, since it's a quick one.
- Dec 2026Windows agents and Authenticator 6.2.2
MFA Agent 2.3.3 to 2.3.5 and Authenticator for Windows 6.2.2. Expect a change freeze to take weeks off this.
- Jan 2027Authentication Manager 8.7 SP2
Level 1 extended support runs to January 2028 and Level 2 to January 2029. That's a bridge, and you'd still have to cross it.
- Mar 2027Authenticators, and Visual Confirmation goes
Authenticator for Windows 6.2.3 and mobile 4.6 end. ID Plus moves Visual Confirmation users to Selection.
- Feb 2028Authentication Manager 8.9
Oddly, RSA's table puts this before 8.8's April 2028 date. Plan around whichever release you end up on.
- Apr 2028Authentication Manager 8.8
Level 1 extended support runs a year past this, and you won't get a Level 2 here. That's a shorter bridge than 8.7 SP2 has.
Your options, side by side
Most teams on 8.7 SP2 end up choosing between four routes. Pricing depends on your RSA contract and licence count and RSA doesn't publish it, so we won't guess. Effort turns mostly on how many agents and RADIUSdefinitionAn old protocol plenty of VPNs and network boxes still use. They ask a server if a login's good, and they act on the answer. clients you've got, because the appliance work is the small part.
| Criteria | Upgrade in place | Build new, then move | Extended support | Add ID Plus |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| What it is | 8.7 SP2 to 8.8, then 8.8 to 8.9, on your existing appliances | Stand up 8.9 beside the old system, export and import, cut agents over | Stay on 8.7 SP2 under a Level 1 or Level 2 agreement | Cloud MFA alongside, with Authentication Manager as a secure proxy |
| Best fit | Supported appliances and a clean agent list | An old appliance, an old version or a messy deployment | A bridge while one of the others finishes | Cloud and SaaS apps, or passwordless plans |
| Main risk | Major upgrades can't be reversed, and old agents may fail after 8.8 | You rebuild settings by hand, and RSA says its list isn't exhaustive | Older releases may get hotfixes as needed. Quarterly patches go to the latest major release | It doesn't remove the on-premises server, which still needs upgrading |
| Effort driver | Testing agents and RADIUS clients at each hop | Re-pointing every agent, and clearing node secrets on UDP agents | Contract terms. Read what your level covers | Rolling out apps and agents to users |
A word on extended support. RSA's definitions of Level 1 and Level 2 sit in an FAQ behind a customer login, so we can only say what's public: the dates, and that 8.8 and 8.9 have no Level 2. Ask your RSA account team in writing what your level includes, and whether it covers security fixes for the advisories above.
Today: 8.7 SP2 with a mix of agents, some of them old
The server still answers everyone, including agents RSA has stopped supporting. Nobody gets warned about that until the TLS defaults change.
Afterwards you're on 8.9 with no unsupported agents left
Every instance sits on the same version and patch level, the old Windows agent is gone, and ID Plus can sit alongside for cloud apps through the secure proxy.
- Primary support ends in January 2027
- RSA-2026-15 lists no fixed patch for this line
- Quarterly patches don't reach this line. RSA may issue hotfixes as needed
- Old agents keep connecting, which hides the problem
- Every month adds to the pile of skipped patches
- Quarterly patches, as the latest major release
- RSA-2026-15 and RSA-2026-17 fixes included
- You can start on passwordless, if your agent offers it and you've got the secure proxy
- Admin SDK qualified on JDK 11 and 17
- You'll have to get rid of old agents first, which cleans up the list
What to do now, by who you are
- Ask one question: which SecurID versions do we run, and do any end by January?
- Name someone to own the upgrade, including the agents outside the identity team.
- Book change windows now, because a freeze can take most of December.
- Write down the version and patch level on every server. Replicas and the Web Tier count too.
- Check each appliance model against RSA's hardware table. An old model changes the whole plan.
- Ask RSA Support now if the old MFA API credentials are null. That one stops the 8.8 upgrade cold.
- List every RADIUS client and agent. Flag custom ones and anything on UDP, since RSA no longer supports those.
- Get MFA Agent for Windows off 2.3.3 to 2.3.5 before the end of December.
- Test old devices against 8.8 in a lab for the non-PFS cipher change.
- Log RSA-2026-15 against any affected server and put a date on the fix. RSA-2026-17 only names 8.9 packages, so ask RSA in writing if it applies to you.
- Decide between Selection and Input before the setting goes. Nobody else will make that call for you.
- Get the extended support terms in writing if you'll need a bridge.
An upgrade path that holds up
From inventory to 8.9 on the current patch
- 01Inventory everything that authenticates
Pull agents and RADIUS clients from the Security Console, then ask the network team what they've added since. Someone usually has a device nobody listed. Sort each one into supported, deprecated or unknown.
- 02Pick in place or new build
Use in place if your appliances are on RSA's list and the deployment is clean. Pick a new build if the hardware won't go to 8.9, or you're several versions back. RSA's own migration article says sometimes it's simplest to start over.
- 03Replace old agents before you touch the server
RSA says the MFA agent is the only supported Windows agent since June 2024. Getting rid of 7.4.x first takes the port 5550 and cipher problems off the table, and RSA's workaround for them leaves you on an unsupported agent anyway.
- 04Back up off the box
Take a backup before every upgrade and patch, and keep the file outside the appliance. Virtual and cloud snapshots help too. A failed major upgrade means restoring, so test that restore while nothing's on fire.
- 05Upgrade the primary, then replicas, then the Web Tier
RSA's order matters, and replicas keep answering logins while the primary is down. Don't promote an older replica in the middle of this without reading RSA's notes first. Update the Admin SDK at the end if you use it.
- 06Test at 8.8, then go straight on
Treat 8.8 as a stop on the way. Run your VPN, RADIUS and Windows logins and check the TLS change while you're there. Then take 8.9 and patch up to at least Patch 5, allowing 20 to 60 minutes per patch on each instance, by RSA's estimate.
- 07Clean up authenticators and code matching
Roll out Authenticator 4.7 and Windows 6.2.7 through your device tools, and pick your code matching method before March. Tell users what the prompt will look like before it changes, or the help desk gets the calls.
If you're building new, a few details from RSA's migration article will save you a repeat attempt. An 8.9 primary needs Patch 1 or later before it can import users and tokens. Profile names are case sensitive, and device type, authentication type and delivery method have to match exactly. System settings get recreated by hand, identity sources included, and UDP agents need their old node secret cleared before they'll talk to the new server.
If the upgrade goes wrong
RSA says plainly that major version upgrades can't be reversed and a failed one shouldn't simply be re-run. Your way back is the backup, so most of this gets decided before the window opens.
- 01Stopfirst minutes
- Don't apply the major version again. RSA advises against retrying it.
- Check that the other instances are still processing logins, and keep them untouched.
- 02Keep people workingfirst hour
- Tell the help desk which logins may fail, and which route still works.
- Point critical VPN and RADIUS traffic at an instance that's still healthy, if your setup allows it.
- 03Restoresame window
- Restore from the Authentication Manager backup, or your cloud or virtualization snapshot.
- Open a case with RSA Support before you try again, with the upgrade logs to hand.
- 04Find the failing piecefirst day
- If REST-based agents fail with no activity monitor entry, set the Trace Log level to Error in the Security Console and read imsTrace.log under /opt/rsa/am/server/logs.
- RADIUS clients failing by NAS IP? RSA's fix is an rsautil change to NAS-IP-Address, and then you restart all services.
- For old Windows agents, look for the 23029 NON_SSL_SOCKET error, then replace the agent.
- 05Learn and rebookthis quarter
- Add whatever failed to your test list, and rehearse on a copy.
- Align all instances on one version and cumulative patch level before you call it done.
What this looks like at three kinds of company
- the setup
- Two A130 appliances still run an older 8.x release behind the VPN and core banking jump hosts. The audit calendar has an MFA review in spring.
- what happens
- The upgrade can't happen on that hardware. RSA says the A130 isn't compatible with any supported version, so getting to 8.9 starts with a hardware purchase.
- what to do
- Build new on virtual or current appliances, import users and tokens, and move agents over in batches. Ask RSA about a bridge if the buying process runs long.
- the setup
- Virtual appliances are fine, but some shop-floor PCs still use Authentication Agent 7.4.x on DHCP, and others run MFA Agent 2.3.4. Plant downtime has to be booked months out.
- what happens
- The server upgrade would go smoothly, then the plant PCs stop registering after 8.8 Patch 3. Nobody on the identity team knew they used port 5550.
- what to do
- Move the plant PCs to the current MFA agent first, during booked maintenance. Hold the server's 8.8 step until that's finished, and accept extended support if you need it.
- the setup
- Most apps use ID Plus and the cloud service updates itself. One Authentication Manager still fronts the VPN, and staff approve push prompts with Visual Confirmation.
- what happens
- With the March release the setting disappears and everyone moves to Selection. If nobody warned them, help desk tickets follow, and 8.7 SP2 is still sitting there.
- what to do
- Check which code matching methods your admin console offers, including Input, and change the setting before March, then announce it. After that, upgrade the server, or ask whether the VPN can move off it.
How Cohash helps
We plan and run SecurID upgrades, starting with the inventory that usually decides the whole job. See our RSA SecurID page for what we cover, hire an engineer if your team's short for the cutover, or start with an assessment to find out what's actually talking to your server.
What to take from this
- 01
RSA's dates land at the end of the month: December for older Windows agents, January for 8.7 SP2, March for more authenticators.
- 02
Check the appliance model first. It can turn an upgrade into a rebuild.
- 03
8.7 SP2 goes to 8.8 and then 8.9. Major upgrades can't be reversed, so back up off the box.
- 04
Replace old agents before you touch the server, because 8.8 changes TLS defaults and Patch 3 turns off port 5550.
- 05
Pick your code matching method before March instead of accepting the automatic move to Selection.
01When does RSA Authentication Manager 8.7 SP2 support end?
Primary support ends in January 2027, and RSA says dates land at the end of the stated month. Its table shows Level 1 extended support to January 2028 and Level 2 to January 2029. Check what your contract actually includes.
02Can we upgrade straight from 8.7 SP2 to 8.9?
No. RSA's 8.9 notes say the upgrade applies to appliances running 8.8, and anything older goes to 8.8 first. So it's two major upgrades, and each one is irreversible. Test at 8.8, then carry on to 8.9.
03Will SecurID stop working when support ends?
Nothing in RSA's notices says logins stop on that date. What you're already short of is the normal route to fixes. Quarterly patches only reach the latest major release, and RSA-2026-15 lists no fixed patch for 8.7 SP2, so waiting leaves your MFA server with known critical flaws.
04Is our hardware appliance able to run 8.9?
RSA's table lists the A230, A330, A350, A430 and A450 for 8.9. It names the A130 as not compatible with any supported version, and the 250 isn't in the table. On older hardware, plan a new build. Check whether an 8.9 hardware image is out for your model first.
05Will our users notice when Visual Confirmation goes away in March?
They'll be picking the right code from a list, because RSA moves anyone still on the old setting to Selection. Check yours under My Account > Company Settings > Sessions & Authentication. If you measure against NIST SP 800-63B-4, look at Input too, since NIST says a list of codes doesn't meet its requirement.
06Which MFA Agent for Windows should we move to?
RSA's life cycle table lists 2.5 as the newest version, with no end date shown. Versions 2.3.3 to 2.3.5 end in December 2026, and 2.3.6 in August 2027. RSA also withdrew 2.4.0, 2.4.1 and 2.4.2 from download, so anyone on those needs 2.4.3 or later.
07Can we buy more time with extended support?
RSA lists extended support dates for 8.7 SP2, so a bridge exists on paper. What each level covers sits in an FAQ behind RSA's customer login. Ask your account team in writing, especially whether it covers security fixes, since RSA says older releases may get hotfixes as needed.
08We're moving to ID Plus anyway. Can we skip the server upgrade?
Not if Authentication Manager stays in place. The cloud service updates itself, but your on-premises server keeps its own dates. Some teams will keep it for VPN and RADIUS and add ID Plus next to it, so plan for both unless the VPN moves off too.
Three questions, about a minute
Pick an answer and we'll tell you if it's right, and why it is or isn't. The score stays in this browser.
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Q1Your two appliances are A130s on an older release, and you need to reach 8.9. What's the realistic route?
show the answer
B. Plan a new 8.9 build and move everything across to it RSA says the A130 isn't compatible with any supported version, so an in-place upgrade won't get there. A new build with an export and import is the route that fits.
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Q2A major upgrade to 8.8 fails halfway through on the primary. What should you do first?
show the answer
C. Stop, keep other instances serving logins and restore from your backup RSA says major upgrades can't be reversed, advises against applying the version again, and says to restore from backup or snapshot. Check that your other instances are still processing logins while you do.
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Q3Compliance works to NIST SP 800-63B-4, and your users still tap through Visual Confirmation. What would you do next?
show the answer
D. Ask compliance about Selection and Input, then pilot whichever they'll accept NIST rules out compare-and-approve, and its text also says a list of codes doesn't meet the transfer requirement. Selection is automatic but your standard may point to Input, so decide before the change.