industries · energy, oil & gas

Access to control systems you can explain to a TSA inspector and a NERC CIP auditor.

Pipeline operators and utilities run corporate IT and operational technology side by side. Contractors, OEM technicians and shared accounts cross that boundary every day. We build the identity and privileged access controls that keep each crossing approved, logged and easy to prove.

industry / energy 5 rules in scope
01 · CORPORATE IT 02 · IT/OT BOUNDARY 03 · OT NETWORK (ESP) 04 · EVIDENCE HR and contractor records: employees · contractors · vendors HR and contractorrecords employees ·contractors · vendors IGA platform: CIP access lists · approvals IGA platform CIP access lists ·approvals Corporate directory: Entra ID · MFA Corporate directory Entra ID · MFA Intermediate System and PAM: jump host · session recording Intermediate Systemand PAM jump host · sessionrecording Shared account vault: rotation where devices allow Shared account vault rotation where devicesallow SCADA and EMS: control center · backup center SCADA and EMS control center ·backup center HMIs and engineering stations: local accounts · vendor tools HMIs and engineeringstations local accounts ·vendor tools Field devices: RTUs · PLCs · relays Field devices RTUs · PLCs · relays CIP-004 verification: quarterly · revocation timing CIP-004 verification quarterly · revocationtiming Session and monitoring logs: CIP-005 · CIP-015 Session andmonitoring logs CIP-005 · CIP-015
SailPointCyberArkBeyondTrustMicrosoft Entra ID
in short·15-second read

Energy companies have to control who reaches operational systems, from control-room engineers to vendor technicians, and then prove it to TSA or NERC auditors.

Cohash designs and builds identity governance, privileged access and brokered remote access around OT networks. We tie that access back to HR and contractor records. Then we set up the evidence that CIP-004 access reviews and the TSA pipeline directives ask for.

you probably need this if
  • A contractor's termination reaches Active Directory the same day but the control-room accounts weeks later.
  • OEM vendors connect to plant systems with a shared VPN account that nobody has rotated in years.
  • Each quarterly CIP-004 verification is a spreadsheet stitched together from tickets and badge exports.
Ask an engineer facts checked 2026-10-20 · 7 sources
how it runs
  1. 01Map each rule to its systems
  2. 02Measure who can reach regulated data
  3. 03Fix and automate the controls
  4. 04Produce evidence auditors can sample
rules
TSA Security Directive Pipeline-2021-02 seriesNERC CIP-004NERC CIP-005NERC CIP-007NERC CIP-015-1
platforms
regulations

The rules your access program answers to

Summaries for orientation, not legal advice. Each links to the primary text.

TSA Security Directive Pipeline-2021-02 series

Applies to owners and operators of TSA-designated critical pipelines. Operators need an approved Cybersecurity Implementation Plan covering IT/OT network segmentation, access control, continuous monitoring and risk-based patching, plus a tested incident response plan. TSA posted the current revision, 02G, on 1 May 2026.

source ↗

NERC CIP-004 (personnel and access management)

Anyone with electronic or unescorted physical access to BES Cyber Systems needs an authorization record behind it. You verify that access at least once a calendar quarter, and complete removals within 24 hours of a termination action.

source ↗

NERC CIP-005 (electronic security perimeters and remote access)

Remote interactive sessions must pass through an Intermediate System. Encryption ends there and MFA is required. You also need a way to see which vendor remote sessions are active and to disable them.

source ↗

NERC CIP-007 (system security management)

System access control for BES Cyber Systems. Enforce authentication, and keep an inventory of shared and default accounts. Apply password rules where technically feasible. Limit failed login attempts, or alert on them.

source ↗

NERC CIP-015-1 (internal network security monitoring)

FERC approved it in June 2025 in Order No. 907, and told NERC to extend it to EACMS and PACS. It requires monitoring of network traffic inside the Electronic Security Perimeter. That applies to high impact systems, and to medium impact systems with External Routable Connectivity.

source ↗
from rule to evidence

How a regulation turns into proof.

For energy, oil & gas, each rule below lands as a control, the control runs on a platform, and the platform leaves a record an auditor can read.

  1. 01

    Rules you answer to

  2. 02

    Controls we build

    Identity governance that includes OTBrokered privileged and vendor accessShared account inventory and vaultingAudit evidence on a scheduleOT data into analytics without new inbound paths
  3. 03

    Platforms that enforce them

  4. 04

    Evidence your auditors read

    Access review records Joiner, mover and leaver logs Privileged session records Change and approval history Control-to-rule mapping
the story · energy, oil & gas access program

From the first call to a setup your own team can run.

Here's what usually prompts a call about your energy, oil & gas access program, what we do about it and in which order, and where you end up.

  1. chapter 01 · where it hurts

    Why teams reach out

    • A contractor's termination reaches Active Directory the same day but the control-room accounts weeks later.
    • OEM vendors connect to plant systems with a shared VPN account that nobody has rotated in years.
    • Each quarterly CIP-004 verification is a spreadsheet stitched together from tickets and badge exports.
  2. chapter 02 · what we change

    How we solve it

    • Identity governance that includes OT
    • Brokered privileged and vendor access
    • Shared account inventory and vaulting
    • Audit evidence on a schedule
    • OT data into analytics without new inbound paths
  3. chapter 03 · how it runs

    Our approach

    • Map each rule to the systems it touches
    • Measure who can reach regulated data today
    • Fix access and automate the controls
    • Produce evidence auditors can sample
  4. chapter 04 · where you end up

    What changes

    • The quarterly verification comes out of one system.
    • Every vendor session has a named technician on it, plus the control room's approval and a recording.
challenges and answers

Where it usually goes wrong, and what we do about it

where it goes wrong
  1. 01

    IT and OT identities live in different places

    Control-room accounts sit in a separate Active Directory forest or locally on HMIs and historians, so an HR termination never reaches them. Someone reconciles the lists by hand before every audit.

  2. 02

    Vendor and contractor remote access

    OEM technicians and integrators need sessions into OT assets, often at short notice. Shared VPN accounts and always-on connections are hard to defend under CIP-005 and the TSA access control outcome.

  3. 03

    Shared and default accounts on field equipment

    RTUs, PLCs, relays and historians often only support local or shared accounts. You still need an owner for each one, an entry in the inventory, and a written password approach.

  4. 04

    Evidence spread across tools

    Approvals live in tickets, badge records in the physical access system and session logs on a jump host. Building a quarterly CIP-004 verification means pulling all three together by hand.

  5. 05

    Operational data heading into IT analytics

    Historian and SCADA data feeds maintenance, planning and trading teams. Every new feed is another path across the IT/OT boundary that has to be designed, approved and documented.

how we help
  1. 01

    Identity governance that includes OT

    Joiner, mover and leaver flows that reach OT directories and CIP access lists. Authorization records and quarterly verification are held in the governance platform, not a spreadsheet.

  2. 02

    Brokered privileged and vendor access

    Vendors get remote sessions only through an Intermediate System, with MFA, recording and approval each time. Operators see every vendor connection that's open and can cut any of them off.

  3. 03

    Shared account inventory and vaulting

    We inventory shared, default and service accounts on OT assets. Where a device allows it, we vault and rotate them. Where it doesn't, we write down the exception.

  4. 04

    Audit evidence on a schedule

    We schedule exports from the IGA, PAM and physical access systems into one evidence store, so access verification and revocation timing can be shown requirement by requirement.

  5. 05

    OT data into analytics without new inbound paths

    Historian data replicated outbound to a DMZ and on to Databricks or Snowflake, with dataset access granted by role. Nothing in the analytics platform gets a route back into the control network.

typical situations

Situations we walk into

We pieced these together from energy, oil & gas situations that come up a lot. They're patterns. You won't find a specific client in them.

case file 01

Quarterly CIP-004 verification stitched together from three exports

composite · not a client story
  1. Beforethe situation

    Every quarter, someone builds the CIP-004 access verification by hand from a ticket export, the physical access system and the jump host's user list. Revocation times for terminations get pieced together from email. The last audit noted gaps.

  2. What we dothe work

    We move the CIP access lists into the IGA platform and give every entry an authorization record. The physical access system and jump host become sources. Now when someone is terminated, revocation tasks open with timestamps, and exports reach one evidence store on a schedule.

  3. Afterwhere you end up

    The quarterly verification comes out of one system. Revocation within 24 hours is shown by timestamps instead of email, and nobody spends the week before the audit building the package.

case file 02

OEM technicians on an always-on VPN into compressor station controls

composite · not a client story
  1. Beforethe situation

    A pipeline operator's OEM technicians reach compressor station controls over an always-on VPN account the vendor's staff all share. The TSA directive wants access control and monitoring at the IT/OT boundary. That account can't be tied to anyone.

  2. What we dothe work

    We put a brokered access point in the OT DMZ. It has MFA and named vendor accounts, and the control room approves each session. Sessions are recorded, and operators see every active vendor connection. After a cutover period, the shared VPN account is turned off.

  3. Afterwhere you end up

    Every vendor session has a named technician on it, plus the control room's approval and a recording. When something looks wrong, an operator kills it from one console.

architecture

How access reaches control systems in a pipeline or utility

HR and contractor records decide who is allowed into OT. Any interactive session goes through a brokered access point with MFA, and it gets recorded. Those access lists and session logs are what you hand the auditor.

How access reaches control systems in a pipeline or utility HR and contractor records decide who is allowed into OT. Any interactive session goes through a brokered access point with MFA, and it gets recorded. Those access lists and session logs are what you hand the auditor. 01 · CORPORATE IT 02 · IT/OT BOUNDARY 03 · OT NETWORK (ESP) 04 · EVIDENCE lifecycle events approved access MFA checkout brokered session brokered session engineering access access records recordings HR and contractorrecords employees · contractors ·vendors SP IGA platform CIP access lists ·approvals Ex Corporatedirectory Entra ID · MFA CA IntermediateSystem and PAM jump host · sessionrecording Shared accountvault rotation wheredevices allow SCADA and EMS control center · backupcenter HMIs and engineeringstations local accounts · vendortools Field devices RTUs · PLCs · relays CIP-004 verification quarterly · revocationtiming Session and monitoringlogs CIP-005 · CIP-015
Read the diagram as text
  1. HR and contractor records → IGA platform: lifecycle events
  2. IGA platform → Intermediate System and PAM: approved access
  3. Corporate directory → Intermediate System and PAM: MFA
  4. Shared account vault → Intermediate System and PAM: checkout
  5. Intermediate System and PAM → SCADA and EMS: brokered session
  6. Intermediate System and PAM → HMIs and engineering stations: brokered session
  7. Intermediate System and PAM → Field devices: engineering access
  8. IGA platform → CIP-004 verification: access records
  9. Intermediate System and PAM → Session and monitoring logs: recordings
case studies

Work on the platforms energy, oil & gas runs on

All case studies
modernization Security operations

Service account, API key and non-human identity cleanup

Tracking down every service account, app registration, API key and AI agent, putting an owner on each and moving them to short-lived, federated credentials.

read the case study
implementation Security operations

CMMC Level 2 and SOC 2 readiness

Engineering the identity, access, logging and evidence controls behind CMMC Level 2 and SOC 2, so assessments rest on system evidence rather than narrative.

read the case study
migration Privileged access

CyberArk PAM Self-Hosted to Privilege Cloud (Idira PAM SaaS)

We move CyberArk PAM Self-Hosted vaults to Privilege Cloud, now sold as Idira Privileged Access Management. Rotation and sessions keep working.

read the case study
modernization Privileged access

Secrets in code, pipelines and config files to HashiCorp Vault

We track down passwords, API keys and tokens in repositories, CI variables and config files and move them into HashiCorp Vault, with short-lived credentials.

read the case study
consolidation Identity and access

Identity integration after a merger or carve-out

We give people access on day one after a merger or divestiture. Then directories, identity providers and governance get merged or separated, on a plan.

read the case study
upgrade Identity and access

IdentityIQ 8.x to 9.0 upgrade

Upgrading SailPoint IdentityIQ 8.x to 9.0, with the route through 8.5, the iiq-precheck scan, javax to jakarta fixes and a tested rollback.

read the case study
talent and delivery · energy, oil & gas

Certified engineers, wherever you need them.

Some clients want a project team, some want a couple of engineers on theirs. Either works. Onsite, nearshore or offshore, with handovers across time zones that keep things moving.

Onsite

Engineers at your sites in the US

Nearshore

Overlapping hours with US teams

Offshore

Overnight progress on your backlog

All time zones

Coverage handed over across time zones

24-hour coverage · US Central time
OnsiteUS business hours
Nearshoreoverlapping US hours
Offshoreovernight progress
Combinedhandover, not hand-off
01Do you work directly on BES Cyber Systems or inside the ESP?

We design and configure the identity and access controls that reach into OT, and we work under your change control and CIP procedures. Where your program says only your staff may change BES Cyber Systems, we write the design and runbooks and your engineers make the changes.

02We're a pipeline operator, not a utility. Does NERC CIP apply to us?

NERC CIP applies to registered entities on the bulk electric system. TSA-designated pipeline operators fall under the TSA security directives instead. Many energy companies have both kinds of assets, and the access controls overlap heavily, so we map one control set to both and keep the evidence separate.

03Can one PAM platform cover both corporate IT and OT?

Often, yes. It depends on whether the platform can broker the protocols and vendor engineering tools your OT assets use. It also depends on how sites connect, and on whether the Intermediate System needs its own EACMS. Before recommending one platform or a split, we test with representative assets.

04What does a first engagement usually look like?

We usually start with an access assessment. We list every identity store across IT and OT, find the shared and default accounts, trace each vendor remote access path, and look at how evidence is produced today. The findings come ranked and tied to the CIP requirement or TSA outcome they affect, with a sequenced plan.

05Can you help with a CIP audit that's already scheduled?

Yes, though the scope depends on how much time is left. Close to an audit we focus on evidence, such as authorization records, quarterly verifications, revocation timing and remote access logs. Larger design changes usually wait until after the audit and go through your change control.

services

Services for energy, oil & gas

The services energy, oil & gas clients ask us for most, alongside the work on this page.

next step

Tell us what you're running. We'll tell you what we'd do first.

A 30-minute working session with a senior engineer. No slides.

useful to bring
  • The platform and the version you're on
  • Where you need to get to, and by when
  • What's custom: rules, plugins, integrations
  • Any audit finding or deadline driving it